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Article 6

Judicial Admonishments in Illinois Guilty
Plea Proceedings
John F Decker*
and John F Kennedy**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Guilty pleas, which ordinarily are based on plea agreements, are
a phenomenon born of necessity. The criminal justice system
would, for all practical purposes, collapse under the heavy case
load that would result if the state brought all defendants to trial.'
A substantial number of judgments of convictions are based on
guilty pleas.2 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has
scrutinized the process whereby a guilty plea is accepted. Obviously, a defendant entering a guilty plea waives a number of substantial constitutional rights including the sixth amendment right
to a fair trial. To be valid, a waiver must conform to the constitutional requirements enunciated in several United States Supreme
Court decisions. The first section of this Article will examine the
scope of the federal constitutional protections afforded a criminal
defendant who enters a guilty plea. This section also will compare
relevant Illinois decisions with the standards voiced by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Illinois Supreme Court rules supplement the federal constitutional protections afforded ciiminal defendants during guilty plea
proceedings. Some of these rules were designed to assure Illinois
trial court compliance with the various federal protections; others
were promulgated to offer protections to defendants not necessarily
guaranteed by federal law. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules direct the trial court to insure the integrity of the guilty plea proceed* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., 1970, Creighton;
LL.M., 1971, New York University; J.S.D., 1979, New York University.
** Associate, Coffield, Ungaretti, Harris & Slavin, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., 1987, De
Paul University College of Law.
1.

See D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINING IN THE AMERICAN

COURTHOUSE 7-8 (1976).
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 541 n.5 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (of
33,381 criminal defendants disposed of in federal cases in 1964, only 12.5% of these cases
were actually tried). Estimates vary as to the number of guilty pleas disposing of state
and federal cases. One estimate puts disposition of criminal cases by guilty pleas at over
90 percent. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING To PLEAS OF GUILTY 1-2 (1968).
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ing by determining whether (1) a defendant, not represented by
counsel, has validly waived counsel in the context of a guilty plea,
(2) a defendant, whether represented by counsel or not, has been
advised properly of the charges to which he is pleading guilty and
the related sanctions which may be imposed following the plea, (3)
a defendant understands the various trial rights he is waiving as a
consequence of his plea, (4) a factual basis exists to support the
entry of the plea, and (5) a defendant realizes the nature of his
appeal rights following his plea. Thus, it is imperative that these
Illinois Supreme Court Rules and the case law interpretation of
these rules be examined. This matter will be considered in the second section of this Article.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN GUILTY PLEA PROCEEDINGS

The first section of this Article will be devoted to the federal
constitutional concerns that arise during guilty plea proceedings.
This section will explore a variety of questions including whether a
trial court judge is obligated to accept a defendant's offer to plead
guilty, the extent to which such judge must admonish the defendant about the charge, potential sanctions and the waiver of trial
rights that attends a guilty plea before he accepts the defendant's
plea, and the extent to which the trial judge must inquire into
whether the plea is voluntary.
A. No Right to Plead Guilty
Although a defendant entering a guilty plea is entitled to specific
constitutional protections, the right to enter a guilty plea itself is
not constitutionally protected. In 1970, the United States Supreme
Court held that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute
right under the federal constitution to have his guilty plea accepted
by the trial court.
Illinois law reflects the same basic proposition. For example, in
People v. Boyd 4 the Appellate Court for the First District concluded, "[iut is clear that there is no absolute right to have a plea of
guilty accepted by the trial court and such a plea may be rejected
3. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court stated: "[o]ur holding
does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitionally valid guilty plea merely
because a defendant wishes to so plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute
right under the constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court. .. ." Id. at 38, n.
11 (emphasis added).
4. 66 Ill. App. 3d 582, 384 N.E.2d 414 (Ist Dist. 1978). Accord, People v. Morgan,
59 I11.
2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974); People v. Clearlee, 101 Ill. App. 3d 16, 427
N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1981).
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in the exercise of sound judicial discretion." 5 In fact, a guilty plea
should not be accepted, and a motion to withdraw the plea should
be granted, if a defense worthy of consideration exists.6
B. Admonitions RegardingNature of the Charge
The sixth amendment requires in all criminal proceedings that
the accused be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusa-

tion."7 Due process further mandates that a guilty plea be both
voluntary and intelligent.8 Consequently, a criminal defendant
pleading guilty must be informed of the nature of the charge to
which he is pleading guilty. Moreover, the defendant must understand the nature of those charges.
In Henderson v. Morgan,9 the United States Supreme Court explored the scope of these constitutional requirements. In Henderson, the defendant was indicted for first degree murder. 10 Pursuant
to a plea bargain with the prosecutor, and on advice of counsel, the
defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder."I The Supreme

Court reversed the conviction because neither the defense counsel
nor the trial judge explained to the defendant the mental state requirement of second degree murder. 12 Furthermore, the record did
not indicate that the defendant had made any statement acknowledging the existence of such mental state.' 3 Accordingly, the fail-

5. Boyd, 66 Il1. App. 3d at 588, 384 N.E.2d at 419.
6. People v. Ramos, 110 I!!.
App. 3d 225, 441 N.E.2d 1153 (1st Dist. 1982) (dictum)
(citing People v. Spicer, 47 I11.
2d 114, 264 N.E.2d 181 (1970)).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. See generally Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
9. 426 U.S. 637 (1976).

10. Id. at 638.
11. id.
12. Id. at 647.
13. Id. at 646-47. It is noteworthy that the first, albeit unofficial, publication of Henderson contained the following cautionary footnote:
There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or
substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the
offense; we assume that it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is
required.
Henderson v. Morgan, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258 n.18 (1976). However, this footnote was
dropped in the official U.S. Reporter. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
804 (1985). This suggests that an element of a crime need not be "critical" before it merits
are mentioned by the trial court judge.
On the other hand, the text of the official Henderson opinion contains another statement which does limit the reach of the Henderson holding in a particular respect.
Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial
judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the
offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an
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ure to inform the defendant of the mental state requirement, and
the defendant's apparent lack of understanding of the requisite
mental state of the charge, rendered his guilty plea "involuntary"
and violative of due process.14 Thus, where the defendant is not
informed of the basic elements of an offense, and the record lacks
any affirmative suggestion that the defendant understands these elements, the proceeding is presumably constitutionally infirm.
Illinois case law does not seem to follow strictly the Henderson
mandate. In People v. Stewart,"5 the defendant entered a guilty
plea to two murders, one attempted murder, and armed robbery.
The defendant was sentenced to death for the murders. During his
appeal, the defendant asserted that the guilty plea proceedings did
not comport with due process inasmuch as the court failed to admonish him as to the nature of the charges. 6
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the plea and the sentence.
The court noted that in prior cases it had held that the "entire
record may be considered in determining whether or not there was
'7
an understanding by the accused of the nature of the charge."1
The Stewart court observed that defense counsel stated he advised
the defendant "at length"'18 about the "consequences"' 9 of entering
a guilty plea. Also, the defendant and his attorneys did not protest
and, indeed, acquiesced in the recital of the prosecutor's statement
of facts which demonstrated that the defendant's conduct fell
within the charges to which he pleaded guilty.20 The court further
express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases
defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to
give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.
Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. In Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983), the Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of the Henderson ruling by stating: "Under Henderson, respondent must be presumed to have been informed, either by his lawyers or at one of the
pre-sentencing proceedings, of the charges on which he was indicted." Id. at 437. In
Marshall, the Court ruled that the defendant's "intelligence and experience in the criminal justice system" as well as the entire record belied the conclusion that he did not
understand the charge to which he pled guilty notwithstanding the trial judge's failure to
explicitly explain the elements of said charge on the record. Id.
14. Courts often apply the labels "involuntary" and "unintelligent" interchangeably.
Logically, if a guilty plea is based upon unlawful coercion it is involuntary. Where a
guilty plea is entered following no, or inadequate admonishments, it is unintelligent.
Henderson v. Morgan illustrates the use of "involuntary" where perhaps "unintelligent"
is preferable.
15. 101 I11.
2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677 (1984).
16. Id. at 484, 463 N.E.2d at 683.
17. Id. at 484, 463 N.E.2d at 684 (citing People v. Krantz, 58 Il1.2d 187, 317 N.E.2d
559 (1974)).

18. Stewart, 101 Ill.
2d at 485, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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found that the defendant had been admonished of the charges in
open court at his earlier arraignment. 21 Finally, the court pointed
out that the defendant did not claim he did not understand the
charges; rather, he complained that the judge erred in failing to
explain the charges, which was insufficient by itself to establish
constitutional error.2
In People v. Barker,23 the defendant was indicted for attempted
murder. The indictment stated that the defendant "knowingly
with intent to commit the offense of murder, did acts which constitute a substantial step toward the commission of murder ....
The indictment did not allege that "intent to kill" was an essential
element of the crime. 25 Furthermore, prior to his entry of the
guilty plea, the defendant was not admonished that the "intent to
kill" was the requisite mental state of the offense.26
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the indictment alleged the
requisite intent.27 It noted that the indictment was given to, as well
as read to, the defendant and that the defendant stated he understood the charge.2 8 Additionally, the court determined that a factual basis supported the charges.29
The Barker decision is defective, however, in two critical respects. First, attempted murder requires proof of "intent to kill;"
proof of a lesser mental state is insufficient.3 In holding that the
"intent to murder" language in the indictment was sufficient, the
court overlooked the fact that "intent to murder" can be proved if
the defendant "either intends to kill or do great bodily harm...,
or knows that such acts will cause death.... or knows such acts
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm."' 31 Intent
to do great bodily harm or knowledge that one's acts might kill or
do great bodily harm is not a basis for finding attempted murder.32
21. Id.
22. Id. at 486, 463 N.E.2d at 685. It is noteworthy that Justice Simon, in dissent,
determined that the proceeding was violative of due process because the trial judge "did
not explain the nature of any of the charges." Id. at 499, 463 N.E.2d at 692 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
23. 83 111. 2d 319, 415 N.E.2d 404 (1980).
24. Id. at 323, 415 N.E.2d at 405.
25. Id. at 323, 415 N.E.2d at 406.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 327, 415 N.E.2d at 407.
28. Id. at 329-30, 415 N.E.2d at 408-09.
29. Id. at 327, 415 N.E.2d at 408.
30.

J. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES

161 (1986).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(a)(1) & (2) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
32. People v. Jones, 81111. 2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 343 (1979). Indeed the dissent in Barker
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Second, Barker, like Stewart, tolerated the trial court's failure to
admonish correctly the defendant about the charge before accepting the guilty plea. The reading of the defective indictment to
the defendant in Barker was no better than the complete failure to
admonish in Stewart. The fact that the defendant in Barker stated
"I never had no intentions of taking no one's life" during a subsequent sentencing hearing3 3 raises a serious question as to whether
there actually was a factual basis supporting the charge. Yet both
cases affirmed the respective convictions notwithstanding the Henderson v. Morgan pronouncement that the defendant pleading
guilty must be informed properly of the charge.34
A review of Illinois decisions in this area reveals that the appellate courts choose to focus upon whether the defendant actually
knew and understood the nature of the charge to which a guilty
plea is entered, rather than on whether the trial court ceremoniously informed the defendant at the guilty plea proceeding. 35 Accordingly, Illinois shifts the burden to the defendant to show a lack
of understanding of the charge.36
For example, in People v. Cosey,37 the defendant was charged
with two armed robberies and with unlawful use of weapons.38
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant entered a guilty plea.39
During the proceedings, the trial court failed to indicate that the
various offenses in question required proof of specific intent.4 Subsequently, the defendant sought relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act,4 1 claiming that he had not been admonished properly
about the charge as required by the federal constitution.4 2 The petition was dismissed and the defendant appealed. 3 The appellate
court affirmed the dismissal." The reviewing court stated that the
recognized this deficiency. Barker, 83 111. 2d at 333-44, 415 N.E.2d at 410-16 (Moran, J.,
dissenting).
33. Barker, 83 111. 2d at 324, 415 N.E.2d at 406.
34. Id. at 342, 415 N.E.2d at 415 (Moran, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 101 Il.2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677 (1984).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. 66 Ill.
App. 3d 670, 384 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1978).
38. Id. at 671, 384 N.E.2d at 96.
39. Id. at 671, 384 N.E.2d at 96-97.
40. Id. at 672, 384 N.E.2d at 97.

41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1985). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act is
a collateral attack remedy which affords relief to "[a]ny person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a
substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State
of Illinois or both. ...
" Id.
42. Cosey, 66 I!!.
App. 3d at 672-73, 384 N.E.2d at 97-98.
43. Id. at 672, 384 N.E.2d at 96-97.
44. Id. at 674-75, 384 N.E.2d at 98-99.

1988]

Guilty Plea Proceedings

remarks and advice of counsel must be read in a practical and realistic manner. 45 The court held that "if under the totality of the
circumstances the accused did not understand the nature of the
charges, then the guilty pleas are involuntary."" The court concluded that it was clear from the totality of the circumstances that
the defendant was informed of the charges and understood them.
In Illinois, the question of whether a criminal defendant understands the nature of the charge against him requires an examination of the entire record. It has been held that due process is
satisfied when the offense to which a guilty plea is entered merely is
referred to by its name. Simply referring to the offense by its file
number alone, however, is per se violative of due process.4 9
C

Admonitions Regarding PotentialSentences
1. Lack of Proper Admonishments
In order to insure that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent,
the defendant entering the plea must be aware of the sanctions
which the court may impose upon him. 0 The United States
Supreme Court addressed whether the defendant can be afforded
relief on a collateral attack for noncompliance with this requirement in United States v. Timmreck.51 In Timmreck, the defendant
52
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances.
At trial, the judge explained to the defendant that he could be sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and fined, but failed to mention the mandatory special parole term of at least three years.53
The defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, fined, and
given five years mandatory special parole.5 4 Subsequently, the defendant filed a federal section 2255 petition, 5 and moved to vacate
the plea on the grounds that the judge's failure to mention the
45. Id. at 673, 384 N.E.2d at 98.
46. Id. at 674, 384 N.E.2d at 98.
47. Id. at 674, 384 N.E.2d at 99.
48. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 63 I11.
2d 141, 345 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
49. See id.
50. Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984) (plea voluntary
and consistent with due process when the defendant understands the consequences of
entering a guilty plea, including the maximum sentence).
51. 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
52. Id. at 781.

53. Id. at 782.
54. Id.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). The Timmreck Court noted that section 2255 allows for post-conviction relief only if defendant shows "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or an "omission inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 783.
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mandatory special parole term violated Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 6 The district court determined that
the Rule 11 violation did not entitle the defendant to relief under
section 2255 because the defendant suffered no prejudice.-7 The
court of appeals, however, concluded that the violation was per se
prejudicial.5"
The United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the defendant's claim. The Court reasoned that collateral relief under
section 2255 is appropriate only when "the error resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a proceeding inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure. ' ' 59 The Court deemed the
failure of the trial judge fully to inform the defendant about the
mandatory special parole term as only a "technical violation" of
Rule 11.° The defendant was denied relief because temporal compliance with Rule 11 in its entirety is not constitutionally mandated and noncompliance with the sentencing admonishment was
deemed a technical breach of the rule.61
It is important to note that Timmreck dealt with a collateral
attack of a guilty plea proceeding under Rule 11 rather than an
appeal. The Court expressed concern about the "finality" served
by limiting the scope of such collateral attacks, especially regarding convictions based on guilty pleas. 62 A different outcome may
very well have resulted had the defendant attacked the guilty plea
on direct appeal.6 a It must be understood that reviewing courts
legally presume in a collateral attack that a defendant has been
"fairly and finally" convicted, whereas no such principle of finality
attaches to appeals. 64
56. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 states in relevant part:
Advise to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of,
and determine if he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.

57. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 782-83.
58. Id. at 783.
59.

Id. at 784.

60. Id.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 784.
See, eg., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (noncompliance with

Rule 11 deprives the defendant of the rule's procedural safeguards, which are designed to
facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea; defendant allowed to plead over).
64. See, eg., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). The court in Frady stated:
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In Illinois, due process is satisfied where a criminal defendant is
informed of the maximum sentence that the court can impose upon
him. In Stewart,65 the defendant argued on appeal that the guilty
plea proceeding did not comport with due process inasmuch as the
trial court informed the defendant of the maximum penalty of
death, but failed to inform the defendant of the lesser sentencing
options available to the court. 6 At the subsequent sentencing
hearing, the defendant was sentenced to death.67 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention, stating that the
trial judge is under no constitutional obligation to recite "all of the
possible sentencing situations that might arise."' 68 Furthermore, a
constitutional defect in the proceedings did not result simply because the judge "did not ceremoniously inform the defendant of all
the lesser sentences which could be imposed." 69
In People v. McCoy, 7 0 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
trial court's failure to admonish the defendant regarding a
mandatory parole term in a guilty plea proceeding was not a per se
constitutional violation and did not entitle the defendant to collateral relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In McCoy,
the court concluded that because the defendant's actual sentence
was substantially less than the maximum sentence about which the
defendant was informed, there was no "substantial denial of rights
under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois
requiring reversal upon a collateral attack. ' 72 Conversely, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has ruled
Once the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, however,
we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted .... Our trial

and appellate procedures are not so unreliable that we may not afford their
completed operation any binding effect beyond the next in a series of endless

post-conviction collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment commands
respect.
Id. at 164-65.
65. 101 Ill. 2d at 470, 463 N.E.2d at 677 (1984).
66. Id. at 483, 463 N.E.2d at 683.

67. Id.
68.
69.

Id. at 486, N.E.2d at 685.
Id. at 487, 463 N.E.2d at 685.

70. 74 Ill.
2d at 398, 385 N.E.2d 696 (1979).
71. Id. at 402-04, 385 N.E.2d at 698-99.
72.

Id. at 400, 385 N.E.2d at 699. It is important to note that the Illinois Supreme

Court ruled in 1975 that admonishments regarding mandatory parole terms are required
with respect to pleas taken after May 19, 1975. People v. Wills, 61 Ill.
2d 105, 330
N.E.2d 505 (1975). Noncompliance with Wills, if raised on direct appeal, will be considered reversible error. People v. Blackburn, 46 Ill.
App. 3d 213, 360 N.E. 1159 (5th Dist.

1977). Noncompliance with Wills, if raised on collateral attack under the PCHA, normally will not require reversal. People v. Coultas, 75 Ill. App. 3d 137, 394 N.E.2d 26
(5th Dist. 1979). The same approach presumably is the law with respect to admonish-
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that the failure to inform a state criminal defendant of his
mandatory parole term does not comport with due process because
the unmentioned parole term exceeds the sentencing terms of his
plea. 73 Thus, the trial court's failure to admonish properly the defendant in this regard will open the door to reversible error.
2.

Incorrect Admonishments

When the trial court inaccurately informs the defendant of the
possible sanctions following conviction under a guilty plea, a constitutional violation exists only if the misrepresentation detrimentally affects the defendant. 74 Illustrative of this proposition is
People v. Wenger,75 an Illinois appellate court decision. In Wenger,
the defendant was placed on two years probation after pleading
guilty to the offense of possessing less than 2.5 grams of heroin.76
At the time the court accepted the plea, it erroneously told the
defendant that the minimum and maximum sentences were one
and three years imprisonment respectively. 77 The maximum sentence was actually ten years.78 The defendant's probation subsequently was revoked and he was sentenced to a term of 2.8 to 8
years imprisonment. 9
The defendant sought post-conviction relief and contended that
the failure to admonish him properly of the correct maximum sentence rendered his plea involuntary and, therefore, violative of due
process. 80 The appellate court agreed. The court stated that "justice and fairness demand that if a guilty plea rests on an inaccurate
representation as to the maximum penalty the promise implied in
the representation should be fulfilled." 81 Accordingly, the appellate court sentenced the defendant according to the terms of imments regarding "mandatory supervised release," which has replaced parole in Illinois.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(d) (1985).

73. United States ex reL Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980). United
States ex reL Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure to inform state
criminal defendant of mandatory parole term accompanying prison sentence violates due
process).
74. See, eg., People v. Wills, 23 Ill.
App. 3d 25, 319 N.E.2d 269 (4th Dist.), aff'd in

part, rev'd in part, 61 Ill.
2d 105, 330 N.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1974).
75. 42 Ill. App. 3d 608, 356 N.E.2d 432 (4th Dist. 1976).
76. Id. at 609, 356 N.E.2d at 433.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 610, 356 N.E.2d at 434.
79. Id. at 609, 356 N.E.2d at 433.
80. Id. at 609, 356 N.E.2d at 433-34.
81. Id. at 611, 356 N.E.2d at 434 (citing People v. Jackson, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 232, 300
N.E.2d 557 (1st Dist. 1973)).
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prisonment originally expressed by the trial court.8 2
Five years after Wenger, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
the same issue in People v. Walker.8 3 In Walker, the defendant
initially agreed to plead guilty to murder, attempted murder,
armed robbery, and armed violence, pursuant to a plea agreement
under which the defendant would receive a sentence of sixty years
imprisonment.8 4 Before accepting the plea, the trial court explained the indictment to the defendant but inaccurately reported
that the maximum penalty was eighty years imprisonment, rather
than death. 5 The States Attorney failed to correct the trial judge
that the death penalty was in fact a punishment that the defendant
could face upon entering a guilty plea.8 6 Ten days after submitting
his guilty plea, the defendant claimed his guilty plea was defective
and asked the judge for leave to withdraw the plea.8 7 Subsequently, the court permitted the defendant to withdraw his plea. 88
On the date the case was set for trial before a new judge, the
defendant entered an unnegotiated guilty plea to each indictment
count.89 During the sentencing hearing, the State recommended
the death penalty and the court sentenced the defendant to death. 90
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the sentence and
remanded the matter to the circuit court for a sentence no greater
than eighty years imprisonment. 91 The court held that the State's
Attorney's failure to correct the judges statement that eighty year
imprisonment was the maximum possible sentence, constituted unmistakeable adoption of the trial court's position. Accordingly, the
defendant was entitled to rely
on the trial judge's statements to him
92
prior to his original plea.
82.

Wenger, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 356 N.E.2d at 435.

83. 84 11. 2d 512, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981).
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

514, 419 N.E.2d at 1170.
514-15, 419 N.E.2d at 1170.
515, 419 N.E.2d at 1170.
516, 419 N.E.2d at 1171. The defendant claimed his original plea was

faulty because he was mentally incompetent to plead, did not understand the full consequences of his plea, and wanted to plead not guilty on the basis of incompetency. Later,

he indicated he wanted to dismiss the attorney who counseled him to enter the original
plea of guilty. Id.
88. Id. at 517-18, 419 N.E.2d at 1172.
89. Id. at 518, 419 N.E.2d at 1172.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 526, 419 N.E.2d at 1176.
92. Id. at 523, 419 N.E.2d at 1174. The court also noted the vindictiveness principles
underlying North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), are relevant when a prosecu-

tor increases the possible sanction for no valid reason after the defendant has exercised a
procedural right. (Pearcewill be more fully discussed at infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.) The prosecutor, in Walker, failed to point to objective facts which would
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D.

Admonitions Regarding ConstitutionalRights:
Right to Counsel
1. Guilty Plea Proceedings as "Critical Stage"
In Hamilton v. Alabama,93 a defendant charged with a capital
offense was denied his request for appointed counsel at an "arraignment;" during the arraignment the defendant entered a plea
of guilty. 94 The United States Supreme Court held that the arraignment was a "critical stage" entitling the defendant to counsel.
The court emphasized that state law viewed defenses not raised
during arraignment as abandoned. In the light of this fact, the
Court held that the denial of counsel at the arraignment mandated
reversal of the conviction.9" In so holding, the Court opined that
"only the presence of counsel could have enabled the accused to
'96
know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court applied Hamilton to a
similar situation in White v. Maryland.97 In White, the Court ruled
that a guilty plea to a murder at a "preliminary hearing" without
benefit of appointed counsel violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 98 The Court stated that, similar to arraignment, the preliminary hearing must be viewed as a "critical stage"
because state law allowed the guilty plea to be introduced into evidence against the defendant at trial.99 In a later decision,
Santobello v. New York,10o the Supreme Court plainly declared,
"[i]t is now clear . . . that the accused pleading guilty must be
counseled, absent a waiver."'' 1
2.

Waiver of Counsel

A defendant's right to waive counsel, appointed or retained, is
supplemented by the right to proceed without counsel. In Faretta
v. California,0 2 the defendant requested to represent himself. The
trial court denied this request and instead appointed an attorney
justify his change of mind regarding the appropriate sentence as well as notify the defend-

ant, prior to his plea withdrawal, of the consequences of such withdrawal. Walker, 84 Ill.
2d at 524, 419 N.E.2d at 1175.

93.

368 U.S. 52 (1961).

94.
95.
96.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

373 U.S. 59 (1963) (pr curiam).
Id. at 60.
Id.
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 261 (dictum).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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against the defendant's will."0 3 The Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a sixth amendment right to
proceed pro se when he voluntarily and intelligently chooses to do
so.1°4 The Court further ruled that the state may not force a lawyer upon a defendant when the defendant insists on conducting his
own defense.105
In Faretta, the Supreme Court endeavoured to insure that defendants make intelligent waivers of such a significant constitutional right. To insure intelligent waivers, the Court suggested that
trial judges admonish defendants about the drawbacks associated

with self-representation. 106
Whether the defendant is inclined toward self-representation or
not, the trial judge is obliged to determine whether the defendant
desires counsel, appointed or retained, to assist him in his plea decision and in his actual entry of a plea. In Boyd v. Dutton, °7 the
United States Supreme Court declared that a defendant must be
103. Id. at 807-11.
104. The Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for
the accused, it grants to the accused personally the right to make his own defense .... The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails.
Id. at 819-20.
105. In so ruling, the Court noted the following:
[..The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid
to a willing defendant, not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel
upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the
Amendment.
Id. at 820.
106. The Court stated:
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer
in order to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, he should
be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that
the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.
Id. at 835.
107. 405 U.S. 1 (1972). In Boyd, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of
forging checks and one count of possession of a forged check, and was sentenced to
twenty-eight years imprisonment. The defendant sought habeas corpus relief in state
court and alleged, among other issues, that he had been denied the assistance of counsel.
At a post-conviction hearing, a deputy sheriff testified he was present at the arraignment,
that the prosecutor asked the defendant if he wanted a lawyer, and that defendant replied
he did not. The court denied the defendant relief. Subsequently, the defendant sought
federal habeas corpus relief. The court denied relief without a hearing. Id. at 1-2.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded to the federal district court
for an evidentiary hearing due to the insufficiency of the record in support of the government's assertion that there was a waiver of counsel. Id. at 3.
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appraised clearly of his right to counsel in a guilty plea proceeding
and that trial judges should indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver. 08
The Illinois Supreme Court has followed the rulings of Hamilton,"°9 White, 0 and Santobello I' regarding the right to counsel at
a guilty plea proceeding. In People v. Hessenauer,1 2 the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that an arraignment on a felony charge is a
"critical stage" and that the defendant is "entitled to the assistance
of counsel whether or not he requests it." 1 3 . Hessenauer further
determined that an effective waiver of counsel will not be found
unless it appeared from the record that at each critical stage of the
proceedings, the judge specifically offered, and the accused knowingly rejected, the representation of appointed counsel. '14The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently retreated from this standard in
People v. Baker.115
In Baker, the court ruled that competent waiver of counsel at
arraignment by an accused, who is advised therein that he has a
right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, normally is operative throughout all subsequent proceedings. 16 Unless there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a
108. The Court noted in Boyd:
(Tihere were apparently no questions from either the judge or the prosecutor
during the arraignment inquiring whether the petitioner understood the nature
and consequences of his alleged waiver of the right to counsel or of his guilty

plea. A person charged with a felony in a state court has an unconditional and
absolute constitutional right to a lawyer. This right attaches at the pleading

stage of the criminal process... and may be waived only by voluntary and
knowing action .... Waiver will not be 'lightly presumed' and a trial judge

must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Id. at 2-3.
Notwithstanding Boyd's implication that the right to counsel, appointed or retained,
attached to felonies only, the United States Supreme Court ruled later that same year that
no defendant may be imprisoned where there has occurred at trial the unconstitutional

denial of counsel, whether the offense was a felony or a misdemeanor. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In 1979, however, the nation's highest court ruled that
appointment of counsel was not required at trial where imprisonment was a possible
sanction but it was not actually imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). The
aforementioned rulings focus on trial situations, however, the line of demarcation appears
cqually applicable to guilty plea proceedings.
109. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.

112. 45 11. 2d 63, 256 N.E.2d 791 (1970).
113. Id. at 67-68, 256 N.E.2d at 794.
114. Id. at 68, 256 N.E.2d at 794 (emphasis added).

2d 85, 440 N.E.2d 856 (1982).
115. 92 Ill.
116. Id. at 95, 440 N.E.2d at 860-61 (waiver at arraignment was operative at a sentencing hearing).
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particular stage of the proceedings, the trial judge is not 1obliged
to
7

gain an affirmative waiver at subsequent critical stages.'
Notwithstanding Hessenauer's ruling that the right to counsel
attaches only to felonies, Illinois extends the right to counsel to all
criminal defendants actually facing a term of imprisonment. 18 To
date, Illinois law precludes imposing a sentence of imprisonment
on a defendant unless that defendant has been afforded the right to
counsel or has competently waived that right. 1 9 A waiver of the
right to counsel must be unequivocal.' 20 In determining whether
there has been a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the appellate
court must consider the words and conduct of the defendant and
must indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. 12
Furthermore, consistent with Faretta,122 Illinois does require admonishments regarding the "dangers and disadvantages" of selfrepresentation and a determination that the defendant has the
12 3
mental capacity to make a proper waiver of counsel.
3. Competency of Counsel
Once it is determined the defendant is entitled to counsel, and
the defendant exercises that right to counsel, the sixth amendment
requires counsel to be reasonably effective. 24 In the context of
117. Id.
118. ILL. S. Cr. R. 401 (a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 401(a) (1985).
119. See, e.g., People v. Morgese, 94 111. App. 3d 638, 418 N.E.2d 1124 (2d Dist.
1981) (stating that no unrepresented criminal defendant can be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment absent a showing of waiver).
120. See People v. Voight, 52 Ill. App. 3d 832, 838, 368 N.E.2d 165, 169 (3d Dist.
1977) ("the rejection of legal representation must be unequivocal").
121. People v. Vanderwerff, 57 Il1.App. 3d 44, 50, 372 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (Ist Dist.
1978).
122. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
123. People v. Graves, 134 Ill. App. 3d 473, 476-77, 480 N.E.2d 1142, 1144-45 (1st
Dist. 1985).
124. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Court stated that it has long
been recognized that the sixth amendment right to counsel includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Effective assistance requires counsel to force the prosecution's
case to a "meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 656. The Court instructed that the
lawyer is presumed competent to provide effective assistance to the defendant and the
burden rests on the accused to demonstrate incompetence. Id. at 658. Incompetence is
apparent when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful scrutiny. Surrounding circumstances may overcome the presumption of competence. Otherwise, actual ineffectiveness must be demonstrated. Id.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court explained that
the defendant must show two elements to establish a claim of incompetent counsel: (1)
the defendant must show that counsel was not a reasonably effective advocate and (2)
that his performance, in the case at hand, undermined the reliability of the finding of
guilt. Absent proof of sufficient prejudice, it cannot be said that the defendant's conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversial system. Id. at 687. The Court instructed
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guilty pleas and guilty plea proceedings, incompetency of counsel
claims may arise. A critical question in cases of this nature is
whether counsel's misjudgment of evidence, which results in his
giving advise to the accused to plead guilty to a charge, constitutes
per se incompetency and may lead to a subsequent reversal on
grounds of involuntariness or unintelligentness.
In McMann v. Richardson,125 a defendant entered a guilty plea,
motivated in part by the existence of an apparently coerced confession, upon advice of defense counsel.1 26 Thereafter, the defendant
sought, by collateral attack, to vacate his guilty plea alleging it was
prompted by the inadmissible coerced confession.1 2 7 The United
States Supreme Court rejected the claim. 128 The Court explained
that a guilty plea effectuates not only a waiver of the defendant's
trial rights, but also a waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the state may have offered against the defendant. 129 The Court emphasized that a guilty plea entered upon
reasonably competent advice from counsel is an intelligent plea not
open to attack on grounds that counsel may have misjudged the
admissibility of the defendant's confession. 30 Furthermore, a plea
is not deemed unintelligent even if, in retrospect, a court would
have found counsel's advice wrong. Rather, the Court indicated
that the relevant inquiry is whether the advice was within 1the
3
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. '
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hill v. Lockhart 132 that its previously announced two-part standard for determining incompetency- (1) counsel's representation fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the representation
that the standard to be used to mreasure counsel's "effectiveness" is the objective test of

"reasonableness." Id. at 688. In other words, counsel's conduct must amount to reason-

ably effective assistance. The Court reiterated that counsel enjoys a strong presumption
of competency. Id. at 690. Further, the Court stated that where the defense attorney
pursues a particular strategic choice, that in hindsight might not have been the preferred
avenue of defense, this does not undermine a finding of competence unless it can be
demonstrated the error had an effect on the judgment, to wit, without the error the defendant would have likely been exonerated. Id. at 689.
See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (due process requires competency of
counsel at first appeal which defendant enjoys as a matter of right).

125.

397 U.S. 759 (1970).

126.

Id. at 762-63.

127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 766.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 770-71.
474 U.S. 52 (1985).
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likely may have affected the outcome of the case 33 - applies to
representations resulting in a guilty plea. 34 The defendant in Hill
pleaded guilty to murder and theft as part of a plea agreement in
which the prosecutor agreed to recommend that a thirty-five year
sentence for a murder and a ten year sentence for a theft run concurrently.' 35 The sentencing court accepted the recommendation
and told the defendant he would be required to serve at least onethird of the sentence before he was eligible for parole. 36 Despite
the fact that the defendant had a prior conviction, the defendant's
counsel prepared, and the defendant signed, a plea statement indicating no prior convictions. 37 Statutory law required a repeat offender to serve at least half of his sentence before reaching parole
eligibility. 38 The defendant collaterally attacked his conviction on
grounds of incompetency based on counsel's misinformation about
139
his parole eligibility.
The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's plea and held that
4°
the defendant had not been prejudiced by the misinformation.1
The Court noted that the defendant "did not allege in his habeas
petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole
eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on
going to trial."' 4' Accordingly, the Court found no prejudice to
the defendant because the defendant would not have been eligible
for an earlier parole even if he had gone to trial.1 42 The Court said
it was unnecessary to determine if counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility was outside the range of competence expected of defense attorneys because the "prejudice" part of the incompetency
43
standard had not been met.
Regarding the requirement of competent counsel in Illinois, the
state supreme court has ruled that representation of a criminal defendant is constitutionally deficient if counsel's incompetence produced substantial prejudice to the defendant and has defined
substantial prejudice as prejudice without which the result proba133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 121.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 61 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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bly would have been different.'" The court has made no distinction between court appointed and privately retained counsel. 145
In People v. Hale,' " the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that it
would never invalidate a guilty plea based on a suggestion of incompetency without objective proof of the alleged incompetence.147
In Hale, the defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery. 148 The
defendant mistakenly believed that he could withdraw the plea
within thirty days, and less than one month later moved to withdraw the plea. 149 At a subsequent hearing on the motion, he testified that he would not have entered the guilty plea had he known
the he did not have an unqualified right to withdraw it within the
thirty day period. 150 At trial, the defendant offered no proof about
how he acquired such a misapprehension and did not argue that he
was innocent of the charge.' 5 ' The trial court therefore denied his
motion. 52 At a second hearing following a second motion to withdraw, the defendant alleged that his attorney advised him that he
could withdraw his plea within thirty days. 15 3 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw
the plea.' 54 The court stated that the defendant's failure to offer
substantial objective proof of defense counsel's alleged incorrect
advice regarding his withdrawal rights justified dismissal of the
motion to withdraw the plea.' 55 The court thus ruled that mismore, does not provide a bataken subjective impressions, 1without
56
sis to set aside a guilty plea.
It is the opinion of the authors that the cases outlined above offer
2d 163, 168, 457 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (1983).
144. People v. Royse, 99 Ill.
145. Id. at 170, 457 N.E.2d at 1220.
2d 172, 411 N.E.2d 867 (1980).
146. 82 Ill.
147. Id. at 176, 411 N.E.2d at 868.
148. Id. at 173, 411 N.E.2d at 868.
149. Id. at 174-75, 411 N.E.2d at 868.
150. Id. at 175, 411 N.E.2d at 868.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 175-76, 411 N.E.2d at 868-69.
155. Id. at 176, 411 N.E.2d at 868.
156. Id. See also People v. Heral, 54 111. App. 3d 527, 369 N.E.2d 922 (2d Dist. 1977).
In Heral, the defendant attempted suicide seventy-two hours before she entered a guilty
plea. The appellate court held that failure of defense counsel to disclose to the trial court
the attempted suicide prior to entering the guilty plea was not violative of the defendant's
right to competent counsel. Id. at 530, 369 N.E.2d at 924-26. Here, the defendant failed
to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the trial judge would have acted differently
had he been informed of the suicide attempt. Id. at 530-31, 369 N.E.2d at 924-25. Additionally, it was not considered a due process violation that the prosecutor failed to advise
the court about the suicide attempt. Id. at 531-33, 369 N.E.2d 924-26.
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a useful frame of reference for evaluating competency of counsel
prior to a defendant's entry of a plea. In the context of a guilty
plea proceeding, the defendant must show (1) that he was represented by an attorney who failed to offer reasonably effective assistance and (2) that, in his case, he actually was prejudiced by the
attorney's poor quality of representation.
As to the first element, which focuses on the competence of the
particular attorney, McMann insists the attorney's mere misjudgment of evidence does not alone prove incompetency so long as the
advice was within the range of competence expected of defense attorneys. Here, then, if the defendant forgoes a meritorious defense
because of advice that proves erroneous, given to him by an otherwise competent attorney, he will be unable to attack successfully
his guilty plea because of his inability to satisfy the first element of
the two-pronged test for incompetency of counsel.
With respect to the latter element, the defendant will have to
show that if he had challenged the charges or sentence with competent counsel, in all likelihood he would have been found not guilty,
found guilty of a lesser charge, or given a lesser sentence. In that
connection, he will have to advance a meritorious defense or claim
which affected the outcome of the case. Alternatively, as in Hill,
he will not prevail if he cannot demonstrate any actual prejudice.
E. Admonitions Regarding Other Fifth and
Sixth Amendment Rights
1. Personal Admonishments in Open Court
For all practical purposes, proceedings involving the defendant's
guilt terminate when a guilty plea is entered. Nothing remains but
to enter judgment and determine punishment. Consequently,
when the court accepts a guilty plea, the accused effectively has
waived his constitutional rights to challenge the charge. By pleading guilty, the defendant waives his fifth amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. The sixth amendment right
to a jury trial and the right to confront one's accusers is also
waived. Furthermore, entry of a guilty plea relieves the state of its
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant's
presumption of innocence is effectively overcome.
In Boykin v. Alabama,157 the defendant pleaded guilty at his arraignment to five counts of robbery. 58 The record did not reveal
157.

395 U.S. 238 (1969).

158. Id. at 239.
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that the judge asked the defendant any questions concerning the
pleas.I59 Also absent were any statements by the accused regarding
the voluntariness of his guilty pleas.I6 On review, the Supreme
Court reversed the convictions on due process grounds.' 6' The
Court held that the trial judge has an affirmative duty to ensure
that the record indicates that the guilty plea is both voluntary and
intelligent. 62 The Court added that the waiver of certain "important" constitutional rights inherent in entering a guilty plea-the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the
right to confront one's accusers-will not be presumed from a silent record. 63 Implicit in Boykin was the proposition that the
court personally must admonish the defendant about these rights
in open court, and must determine that the defendant understands
them.
Whether the Illinois courts strictly comply with Boykin may be
in doubt. For example, in People v. Coughlin,'" the defendant
pleaded guilty to two counts of deviant sexual assault. 65 Although
the trial judge did advise the defendant that he was waiving his
sixth amendment right to a jury trial by entering a guilty plea, he
failed to inform the defendant that his right to confront his accusers and his right to remain silent also were being waived. 66 The
appellate court affirmed the conviction. The court stated that
Boykin did not compel the trial court to articulate "specific and
literal statements of all constitutional rights of an accused" as part
of the admonishment process.1 67 The court noted that, in this case,
there was nothing in the record168to demonstrate that the defendant
did not understand his rights.
159.

Id.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 242-44.
162.
163.

Id. at 242.
The Court stated:

Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place
when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and

applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. [Citations omitted.] Second, is the right to a jury trial. [Citations omitted.] Third, is the right to con-

front one's accusers. [Citations omitted.] We cannot presume a waiver of these
three important federal rights from a silent record.
Id. at 243.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

7 I1. App. 3d 389, 287 N.E.2d 499 (2d Dist. 1972).
Id. at 390, 287 N.E.2d at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391, 287 N.E.2d at 501.
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Coughlin appears to be inconsistent with the statement in Boykin
that the court "cannot presume a waiver of these three important
federal rightsfrom a silent record."169 It is important to note that
two of the three rights to which the Boykin Court explicitly referred were the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
confrontation. 170 Moreover, Boykin indicated it was the judge's responsibility to assure that the defendant understands the implications of these rights and to make these assurances part of the
record.171 In contrast, Coughlin retreats from the Boykin mandate
by implying that the defendant insisted upon a reading of the specific language of all constitutional rights, even though the defendant never advanced such a claim. Although Boykin does not
require a judge to articulate verbatim every constitutional guarantee affecting those charged with a crime, it does insist on some
mention of the self-incrimination privilege, the jury trial right, and
the right to confrontation. Boykin places the burden on the judge
to inquire affirmatively as to whether the defendant understands
his constitutional rights. In contrast, Coughlin shifted the burden
to the defendant to show a lack of understanding of his rights
before he can complain about the trial court's failure to admonish.
2. Use of Forms Not an Adequate Substitute
In an attempt to expedite matters, some Illinois trial courts have
attempted to inform defendants of the consequences of entering a
guilty plea by disseminating pre-printed forms. For example, in
People v. Cummings,1 72 the defendant pleaded guilty to theft but
was not personally admonished by the court regarding the consequences of the plea. The record reflected that the defendant, his
attorney, and the trial judge each had signed a printed guilty plea
form. 173 The appellate court held that the use of pre-printed forms,
purporting to inform the defendant of the serious consequences of
169. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).
170. See supra note 163.
171. Immediately after stating that a reviewing court cannot presume a defendant's

understanding of these three important rights from a silent record, the Court added:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the

utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
of its consequences. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought [citations omitted] and
forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky
memories.

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44 (emphasis added).
172. 7 Ill.
App. 3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291 (2d Dist. 1972).
173. Id. at 308, 287 N.E.2d at 293.
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entering a guilty plea, was an inadequate substitute for the personal
admonishments regarding the waiver of constitutional rights as required by Boykin.' 74 Thus, the mere use of such forms are not a
legitimate alternative to the judge's verbal inquiry.
F

Determining Voluntariness of Plea

A guilty plea is voluntary when it is made free of unlawful
threats or coercion.'" A plea is intelligent when the defendant is
informed, prior to entering the guilty plea, of the significant consequences of such a plea. 176 As noted, the trial court has a duty, to a
varying degree, to inform the defendant of the nature of the
7
charge, 17 7 the potential sanctions available against the defendant, 791
and the important constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea.'
Other areas that may affect the voluntary and intelligent character
of a plea are prosecutorial threats8 and the defendant's protestations of innocence.' 8 '
The section which follows addresses "voluntariness"''8 2 concerns
that arise during an arraignment. In Boykin v. Alabama,"3 the
United States Supreme Court determined that the trial court has
the burden of establishing that the plea was made freely. The defendant need not prove that the plea is involuntary. In order to
satisfy this burden, "the record must affirmatively disclose that the
defendant who pleads guilty enters his plea understandingly and
voluntarily."'" The Court reasoned that a plea of guilty could be
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 309, 287 N.E.2d at 293.
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
Id. at 242-43.

177. See supra notes 7-49 and accompanying text.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra notes 50-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-174 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
See infra notes at 224-31 and accompanying text.
It should be mentioned that while the terms "voluntary" and "intelligent" seem-

ingly represent different areas of concern, many courts draw no distinctions. For example, in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the United States Supreme Court
referred to a plea as "involuntary" and, therefore, void because the defendant was not
adequately informed of the mental element of the offense to which he was pleading guilty.
Id. at 647. It seems that where a defendant is ill-informed regarding the charge to which
he is pleading guilty, it is an "unintelligent" plea rather than an "involuntary" plea.
Practitioners and students should be aware of the fact that the terms are often used sy-

nonymously. In any event, the discussion which follows focuses on voluntariness, rather
than intelligence, concerns.
183. 395 U.S. 238. See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (summary

dismissal of collateral attack of guilty plea based on claim of involuntariness reversed
where trial record did not adequately demonstrate voluntariness).
184. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244.
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the result of coercion or threats. ' Consequently, the Court imposed the duty upon the trial court to show voluntariness and intelligence and thus 1made
guilty pleas less susceptible to post86
challenge.
conviction
In 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court also raised serious doubt
regarding its willingness to follow Boykin's language on voluntariness. In People v. Stewart,8 7 the trial record did not affirmatively
indicate that the accused voluntarily entered a guilty plea.'"" On
appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the guilty plea
conformed with due process standards because there was "no evidence in the record that the defendant was pressured or forced to
enter a guilty plea."' 8 9 In a strong dissent, Justice Moran cited
Boykin and pointed out that due process required "an affirmative
showing in the trial court record" of a voluntary and intelligent
plea. 190 He stated that in this case "careful reading of the record
...
reveal[ed] a complete absence of dialogue between the court
and the defendant regarding the voluntariness of the plea." 19 ' Justice Moran contended that lack of any such dialogue justified the
conclusion that the trial court "completely abrogated its duty to
the defendant."'' 92 Justice Moran also argued that the majority
opinion rested upon the incorrect conclusion that the defendant
had the burden to prove that his plea was less than voluntary. 93
In a separate dissent, Justice Simon agreed with Justice Moran's
assessment of the Boykin mandate. Justice Simon reasoned that
"[w]hen a guilty plea is entered, the question of its voluntariness is
a part of the state's 94
case, not an affirmative defense as the majority
'
appears to imply.'
It is the opinion of the authors that the Stewart majority's will185.

Id. at 242-43.

186. The Court noted that "[b]y personally interrogating the defendant, not only will
the judge be better able to ascertain the plea's voluntariness, but he also will develop a
more complete record to support his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack." Id. at 244.
187. 101111. 2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677 (1984). Other aspects of Stewart were discussed
at supra notes 15-22, 65-69 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 483, 463 N.E.2d at 683.
189. Id. at 487, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
190. Id. at 496, 463 N.E.2d at 690 (Moran, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Justice Moran pointed out that such a conclusion necessarily implied that the
burden was on the defendant to prove that his plea was coerced when, in fact, the burden
was on the state to prove that the plea was voluntary. Id. at 498, 463 N.E.2d at 691
(Moran, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 502, 463 N.E.2d at 693 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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ingness to sidestep Boykin, by switching the burden of proof in voluntariness claims from the state to the defendant, reflects a
complete misunderstanding of the principles and concerns that are
at the heart of Boykin. Such a shift will add unnecessary confusion
to the guilty plea proceeding, perpetuate needless appeals, and hinder the effective administration of justice. Strict compliance with
Boykin can do nothing but insure the integrity of the guilty plea
proceeding, protect the due process rights afforded the defendant
by the United States Supreme Court, and provide a clear record
which, in turn, will prevent subsequent attacks by those convicted
through a guilty plea. 95 The duties imposed upon the trial court
by Boykin are not onerous when weighed against the substantial
interests served.
G.

ProsecutorialThreats and Vindictiveness

In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court stated, that "coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover up of unconstitutionality."'' 96 Not all prosecutorial
threats, inducement or coercion, however, render a guilty plea involuntary. In Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 97 the prosecutor threatened
during plea negotiations to seek indictment of the defendant as a
habitual criminal if the defendant refused to accept the prosecutor's offer to recommend a five year sentence in return for a guilty
plea to the original indictment. 98 When the defendant refused the
prosecutor's offer, the prosecutor followed through on his threat to
prosecute the defendant as a habitual criminal, an offense carrying
a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment. 99 The Supreme Court
held that due process was not violated.2 00 The Court reasoned that
the prosecutor legally was exercising the discretion of his office. 20 '
Accordingly, the Court held that absent a showing of prosecutorial
vindictiveness, the exercise of such discretion does not render a
guilty plea involuntary.20 2
195. 395 U.S. 23 (1969).
196. Id. at 242-43.
197. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
198. Id. at 358-59.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 365.
201. Id. at 364-65.
202. Id. at 362-65. See also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381-84 (1982)
(no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when prosecutor indicted defendant on
additional, more seriots. charges after defendant abandoned plea negotiations and requested jury trial).
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In North Carolina v. Pearce,"3 the Supreme Court deliniated the
circumstances under which prosecutorial vindictiveness may violate due process. In Pearce, two defendants were reprosecuted after their original convictions had been overturned. 2° 4 After being
convicted a second time of the same charges, the defendants were
sentenced, upon the prosecutor's recommendations, to terms
which exceeded those of the original sentences. 2 5 The Court ruled
that although double jeopardy permitted the retrials, it also required that the defendants be credited for time already served following the original conviction. 206 The Court added that due
process prohibits vindictiveness directed at the defendant during
resentencing for exercising his right to appellate or collateral review.207 In order to prohibit such prosecutorial or judicial vindictiveness, it is incumbent upon the court to point to "identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the
original sentencing proceeding" before it imposes a sentence following retrial which is in excess of the original sentence. 20 8 Further, the "factual data" supporting any greater sentence following
retrial must be placed in the record for purposes of possible
review. 20
It is the opinion of the authors that the teachings of
Bordenkircher and Pearce offer a useful frame of reference when
the defense claims that a prosecutor has exceeded the bounds of
due process during plea bargaining, guilty plea proceedings, or sentencing hearings following guilty pleas. When a prosecutor during
plea negotiations merely threatens an accused with more serious
charges or sanctions if he does not agree to a proposed plea agreement, the defendant usually will not be considered as having suffered prosecutorial vindictiveness in violation of due process.
Furthermore, if the accused, following such threats, moves to vacate his plea on grounds of involuntariness, it is unlikely that he
203.
204.
205.
206.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
Id. at 713-15.
Id.
Id. at 717-19.

207. Id. at 725.
208. Id. at 725-26. See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (prosecutor's

escalation of misdemeanor charge to felony charge after defendant had exercised his right
to trial de novo in superior court held violative of due process because of "realistic possibility" of prosecutorial vindictiveness).

With respect to "judicial vindictiveness" claims, which in part was the claim in Pearce,
compare Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986) (where trial court, rather than re-

viewing court, sets aside conviction in post-trial motion and upon reconviction defendant
subjected to harsher sentence, Pearce "vindictiveness" presumption does not arise).
209.

Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
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will succeed. Similarly, if the pros-,cutor elevates the charge or requests more serious sanctions following the defendant's refusal to
accept a plea agreement, the defendant seldom will have grounds
to complain. On the other hand, when the defendant successfully
moves for a new trial or appeal, the prosecutor's efforts to elevate
the charge or sanctions normally will be viewed as based on
prosecutorial vindictiveness, and be barred by due process.
In People v. Scott,210 the Illinois Supreme Court followed the approach outlined in Bordenkircher.21' The defendant in Scott was
indicted for murder.21 2 After discussing the matter with his attorney, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge and was sentenced to imprisonment.2 3 Subsequently, the defendant filed a pro
se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act alleging, among
other issues, that his constitutional rights had been violated inasmuch as the State's Attorney had told him that if he did not plead
guilty a request for the infliction of the death penalty would be
made.21 4 The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the fear of the
death penalty was not sufficient to invalidate the defendant's otherwise knowing and intelligent plea.215
H. Breach of ProsecutorialPromise
When the state's attorney makes certain promises to a defendant
in exchange for a guilty plea, breach of those promises may render
the plea violative of due process. In Santobello v. New York, 21 6 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that in such circumstances, the
trial court must provide the defendant with specific performance
on the promise, or in the alternative, must permit him to withdraw
his plea.21 7 Conversely, in Mabry v. Johnson,21 8 the United States
210. 49 Ill. 2d 231, 274 N.E.2d 39 (1971).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Scott, 49 Ill. 2d at 232, 274 N.E.2d at 39.
Id. at 232, 274 N.E.2d at 39-40.
Id. at 233, 274 N.E.2d at 40.
Id.
404 U.S. 257 (1971). It is immaterial as to whether the trial court would have

accepted the sentence recommendation. Id. at 262. The Santobello rule would apply in
other circumstances as where, for instance, a defendant entered a plea to a charge upon
his understanding with the prosecutor that other chargis would be dismissed. See also
People v. Starks, 106 Ill. 2d 441, 478 N.E.2d 350 (1985) (where State agreed to dismiss
charge if defendant passed polygraph examination, it was obligated to specifically perform promise); People v. Mitchell, 46 Ill. 2d 133, 262 N.E.2d 915 (1970) (unfulfilled
prosecutorial promise to recommend probation deprives the plea of the character of a
voluntary act violative of due process).
217. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263.
218. 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
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Supreme Court ruled that a defendant does not have a right to
specific performance on a plea bargain where the government retracts its plea agreement offer after the defendant communicates to
the state his acceptance of the state's original offer. 219 Thus, strict
contract law principles do not apply to plea agreements. In such
circumstances, the defendant has not yet entered his plea; he therefore retains the option of not entering a guilty plea and cannot
argue that he was prejudiced.
During plea negotiations, it is conceivable that a prosecutor unwittingly will promise a defendant more than he has the legal authority to deliver. In People v. Morgan,220 the defendant alleged
that the prosecutor promised to waive the mandatory supervised
release period that attaches to all sentences of imprisonment by
operation of law. 22' The appellate court held there was no right to
specific performance for the alleged promise because waiver of
mandatory supervised release is not allowed by law.222 The court
further found that the defendant was informed fully by the trial
court of the mandatory supervised release term when the defendant entered his plea. Accordingly, the court upheld the plea.223
I

Protestationsof Innocence

Of course, justice would not be served if the courts allowed innocent people to plead guilty to crimes and sentenced them to jail.
What then, must the trial court do when a defendant enters a
guilty plea but simultaneously persists in maintaining his own innocence? In North Carolinav. Alford,224 the defendant claimed his
negotiated guilty plea to a charge of second degree murder was
invalid because he denied any culpability when he entered his
plea. 225 He explained that he felt compelled to enter his plea in
order to avoid the original charge of murder in the first degree
219.

Id. at 510-11. See also People v. Boyt, 109 I1. 2d 403, 488 N.E.2d 264 (1985)

(defendant's claim that the guilty plea was involuntary and violative of due process inasmuch as it was entered in reliance on a plea agreement with the prosecution denied because the prosecution withdrew the plea agreement prior to the actual entry of the guilty
plea by the defendant); People v. Navarroli, 146 11. App. 3d 466, 497 N.E.2d 128 (3d
Dist. 1986) (defendant has no right to specific performance on government's plea bargain

offer).
220. 128 Il1. App. 3d 298, 470 N.E.2d 1118 (4th Dist. 1984).
221. Id. at 299-300, 470 N.E.2d at 1119.
222. Id. at 300-01, 470 N.E.2d at 1120; See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8l(d)(1), (d)(2) & (d)(3) (1985) (provides applicable mandatory supervised release term for
Class X felonies and Class 1, 2, and 3 felonies in Illinois).
223. Morgan, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99, 470 N.E.2d at 1120.

224. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
225.

Id. at 28-30.
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which carried the death penalty.226 The United States Supreme
Court ruled that the plea was valid because the trial court found
that a strong factual basis supported the defendant's involvement
in the illegal homicide and there was no indication that the plea
227
was not a product of the defendant's free will.
In People v. Ealey,228 the defendant pleaded guilty to murder apparently because he did not believe he could not refute the testimony which the State could produce.229 In response to the court's
question of whether he understood everything the Assistant State's
Attorney said in presenting the factual basis, the defendant said
that he did not agree with the prosecution's version of what had
occurred. 230 The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District,
citing Alford, affirmed the conviction because the defendant's plea
was voluntary and intelligent, and because the State offered the
court a sufficient factual basis to underly the plea.231
In summary, when a defendant enters a plea to a charge which
has no factual basis, acceptance of the plea would not be appropriate. If a factual basis pointing to guilt sapports the plea, however,
the plea can be accepted notwithstanding the defendant's protestations of innocence. Cases like Alford and Ealey suggest, then, that
a factual basis finding is probably warranted as a matter of consti226. North Carolina law provided for life imprisonment for first degree murder following a guilty plea, while a guilty verdict following a jury trial involving this charge
could result in the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 27, n. 1. When the defendant
entered his negotiated plea, he testified that he had not committed the alleged murder,
but that his plea had been motivated by his desire to avoid the death penalty and to
obtain a lesser sentence. Id. at 28. Upon further inquiry by the trial judge, the defendant
persisted with his wish to plead guilty. Id. at 29. The plea was accepted by the trial court
judge inasmuch as there was strong evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. Id.
at 28. On appeal, the state's court of review fou.nd the defendant's plea to have been
willingly and knowingly entered. Id. at 29.
227. Id. at 37. The court stated an individual may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandably consent to the waiver of trial and the imposition of sentence even if he is
unwillingly or unable to admit to his involvement in the crime. Id. An acknowledgment
of actual guilt on the part of the defendant is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of a criminal penalty. Id. When the accused intelligently concludes his interests
require a guilty plea, the plea is voluntary and intelligent regardless of his unwillingness
to admit guilt. Id.
228. 36 Ill. App. 3d 32, 343 N.E.2d 203 (5th Dist. 1976).
229. Id. at 35, 343 N.E.2d at 204-05.
230. Id. at 34, 343 N.E.2d at 204.
231. Id. at 35, 343 N.E.2d at 204-205. Accord People v. Cope, 61111. 2d 226, 335
N.E.2d at 431 (1973) (Even though the defendant who entered guilty pleas to two
charges of burglary stated he was guilty of one burglary charge but only "partially guilty"
of the other because he had not participated in the burglary itself but had bought the
stolen property, the trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by
accepting the pleas.).
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tutional law if the defendant refuses to acknowledge his guilt to the
crime charged.
III.

ISSUES INVOLVING ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES 401,

402, & 605 IN GUILTY PLEA PROCEEDINGS

Beyond the federal constitutional concerns that accompany
guilty pleas, several important Illinois Supreme Court Rules bear
upon the guilty plea process.2 32 Some of these rules were designed
233
to give meaning and effect to federal constitutional mandates;
others, not mandated by the Constitution, were designed to advance the orderly administration of criminal justice in the context
of guilty pleas.234 These Supreme Court Rules are central to the
discussion which follows. This section also will consider the obligation these rules impose upon a trial judge to admonish defendants who plead guilty. The rules involve: (1) the defendants' right
to counsel throughout the guilty plea proceedings, 235 (2) the
charges lodged against them,236 (3) the potential sanctions which
may follow their plea,237 (4) the constitutional rights they are waiving as they enter their pleas, 238 and (5) their appeal possibilities
239
following such pleas.
A.

Rule 401 -

Waiver of Counsel

If a defendant opts to enter a guilty plea without representation
of counsel, the trial court must act in conformity with the provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401.2 41 Although Rule 401
232.

ILL. S. CT. R. 401,402 & 605, ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 10A, paras. 401, 402 & 605

(1985).
233. See, e.g., People v. Kessler, 113 11. App. 3d 354, 447 N.E.2d 495 (2d Dist.
1983). The court in Kessler stated:
The objective of rule 401(a) is to provide a mechanism which will eliminate any
doubt that an accused understands the nature and consequences of the charges
brought against him before a trial court accepts his waiver of the right to counsel; the rule sets forth the procedure which precludes a defendant from waiving
the assistance of counsel without full knowledge and understanding.
Id. at 359, 447 N.E.2d at 499.
234. See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 402(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 402(c) (factual
basis for plea must be found by trial judge). Compare Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779,
780 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (state court not constitutionally required to establish
factual basis).
235. ILL. S. CT. R. 401, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 401.
236. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 402 (a)(1).
237. ILL. S. CT. R. (402)(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 402(a)(2).
238. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(2), (a)(3) & (a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, paras.

402(a)(2), (a)(3), & (a)(4).
239. ILL. S. CT. R. 605, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. I 10A, para. 605.
240. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) states:
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applies to both civil and criminal proceedings of various types,241
this section will examine only the applicability of Rule 401 in a
criminal proceeding when a defendant is entering a plea of guilty.
Furthermore, this section will discuss the standard of compliance
expected of the trial court in exacting a valid waiver of counsel
from a criminal defendant.
The language of Rule 401 requires that the court provide specific
admonitions whenever a "person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment" enters a plea.242 Furthermore, the rule provides
that these admonitions must be given in open court, transcribed,
and made a part of the common law record.24 a
The language of Rule 401 mandates that the trial court affirmatively secure a knowing waiver of counsel from a criminal defendant proceeding pro se, when that defendant is charged with an
offense possibly punishable by incarceration.2 " In contrast, the
sixth amendment right to counsel, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, attaches only if the criminal defendant is
actually imprisoned. 245 The Illinois Supreme Court likewise has
ruled that the mere possibility of incarceration does not trigger the
defendant's right to counsel.246 It is unclear whether Rule 401. offers protections which exceed those guaranteed by the sixth
amendment because various statutes and rulings exist which give
rise to contrary points of view.247
(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The
Court shall not permit waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment without first, addressing the defendant personally
in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because
of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him by the court.
(b) Transcript. The proceedings required by this rule to be in open court shall
be taken verbatim, and upon order of the trial court transcribed, filed and made
a part of the common law record.
ILL. S. CT. R. 401, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 401.
241. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 401 (Smith-Hurd 1985), 1982 Supreme Court
Note, at 368.
242. ILL. S. CT. R. 401(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 401(a).
243. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 402(b).
244. ILL. S. CT. R. 401(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 401(a).
245. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
246. People v. Scott, 68 II. 2d 269, 272, 369 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1977), aff'd., Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
247. See infra notes 245-83 and accompanying text.
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One interpretation of the reach of Rule 401 appears in People v.
Harpole.248 In Harpole, the defendant was charged with driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and improper lane usage.2 49 The defendant entered an uncounseled guilty plea to the
offenses and was fined. 250 A court reporter was not present during
the plea and sentencing proceedings. 25 ' Thereafter, the defendant,
represented by counsel, filed a motion to vacate the guilty pleas.252
The defendant asserted his innocence and further alleged that his
pleas were not voluntary or intelligent because he did not waive his
right to counsel and to a jury trial. 25 3 Additionally, the defendant
contended that the trial court violated Rule 401(b) by not providing a court reporter for the proceedings.254 At the hearing on the
motion to vacate the plea, the defendant testified that at the time
he entered the guilty plea, he was not represented by counsel.2 5
Further, he asserted he was neither advised of his right to counsel
by the trial court, nor did he waive his right to counsel.25 6
The appellate court held that there was no violation of Rule 401
and affirmed the convictions.257 The court reasoned that Rule 401
was designed to "provide a procedure which will remove any doubt
that a defendant understands the nature and consequences of what
he is charged with before a court accepts his waiver... 258 The
court stated that, notwithstanding the statutory language of Rule
401, its protections apply only if a criminal defendant actually is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 25 9 According to the Harpole
court, it made little sense to inform the defendant of a right to
counsel, let alone secure a valid waiver of that counsel, as no constitutional right to counsel attaches unless the defendant actually
suffered a term of imprisonment. 260 Accordingly, the court held
that Rule 401 was not applicable because the defendant in this case
merely was fined, 261 and the transcript requirement 262 was deemed
248. 135 I1. App. 3d 79, 481 N.E.2d 817 (5th Dist. 1985). See also People v.
Morgese, 94 Il. App. 3d 638, 418 N.E.2d 1124 (2d Dist. 1981).
249. Harpole, 135 I1. App. 3d at 80, 481 N.E.2d at 818.

250. Id. at 80-81, 481 N.E.2d at 818.
251.

Id. at 80, 481 N.E.2d at 818.

252.' Id.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

80-81, 481 N.E.2d at 818.
81, 481 N.E.2d at 818.
80-81, 481 N.E.2d at 818-19.
81-84, 481 N.E.2d at 820-21.
82, 481 N.E.2d at 819.
82-83, 481 N.E.2d at 819-20.
83-84, 481 N.E.2d at 820.
83, 481 N.E.2d at 820.
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inapplicable.263 The court in Harpole interpreted Rule 401(a) and
(b) as necessarily interrelated. 264 Based on that premise, if Rule
401(a) did not apply to a situation, Rule 401(b) necessarily did not
265
apply.
The dissent in Harpole offered an alternative approach. Justice
Jones submitted that "Rule 401(b) has a purpose and a function
that operate independently of Rule 401(a). ' 26 He stated that
"many are the serious consequences that may flow from the imposition of a fine" and, accordingly, a transcript of the waiver of
counsel could take on great significance.267 Although Justice Jones
did not quarrel with the majority's view that Rule 401(a) did not
require counsel, he implied that Rule 401(b) would require a
waiver of counsel reflected in the record if important consequences
were at stake.268 Justice Jones cited People v. McCarty269 to illus2 70
trate the necessity of following this approach.
In McCarty, the defendant committed a misdemeanor theft
while on probation for an earlier felony theft offense. 27 ' The defendant entered a guilty plea to the latter misdemeanor charge
without the benefit of counsel.272 A verbatim transcript of the proceeding was not kept.273 Several days later, the State sought to
revoke the defendant's probation on the felony theft conviction. 274
After the State presented the misdemeanor theft conviction in the
probation revocation proceeding, the court sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for his violation of the conditions of his earlier
262. ILL. S.CT. R. 401(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA,para. 401(b).
263. Harpole, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 83, 481 N.E.2d at 820.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 85, 481 N.E.2d at 821 (Jones, J., dissenting).
267. Justice Jones stated:
Under the view adopted by the majority, when punished by a fine only, a defendant will never be able to point back to any facet of his understanding, or
lack thereof, of the nature of his right to counsel, the consequences that might
flow from lack of counsel or of his need for counsel to represent him. Yet, to
many defendants the consequences of punishment by a fine only may run far
beyond that entailed in the obligation to pay the fine. What of a defendant on
probation or parole at the time he is 'fined'? What of the defendant who loses
his employment because he suffers a conviction and is 'merely fined'?
Id. at 84, 481 N.E.2d at 821 (Jones, J. dissenting).
268. Id.
269. 101 Ill.
App. 3d 355, 427 N.E.2d 1382 (3d Dist. 1981), modified, 94 Il1.2d 28,
445 N.E.2d 298 (1983).
270. Harpole, 135 Ill.
App. 3d at 85, 481 N.E.2d at 821.
271. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 427 N.E.2d at 1383.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 359, 427 N.E.2d at 1385.
274. Id. at 356, 427 N.E.2d at 1383.
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probation. 5 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the State
could not revoke his probation and imprison him on the basis of
the uncounseled misdemeanor theft conviction. 6
The appellate court reversed.
The court ruled that the trial
court could not order imprisonment of the defendant on the basis
of the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction without violating his
right to counsel.2 7 8 Further, the court held a mere "docket entry"
did "not sufficiently demonstrate" a waiver of counsel at the proceeding where the defendant entered his plea to the misdemeanor
theft. 27 9 Here, the trial court's failure to abide by the terms of Rule
401, which requires the making of a record of the alleged waiver of
counsel, undermined the State's claim that the defendant under2 80
stood his right to counsel and waived it.
It is the opinion of the authors that at least two, and perhaps
three, different positions regarding the application of Rule 401 are
available to a court. Each of these positions appears to be supported by law. First, the court may adopt the position expressed
by the majority in Harpole, that Rule 401(a) and (b) are interrelated. Consistent with this view, the Rule 401(b) transcript requirement applies only if Rule 401(a) is relevant and Rule 401(a)
arises only if the defendant will actually be imprisoned.28 1 Second,
a trial court could adopt the position expressed in the Harpole dissent that Rule 401(a) and Rule 401(b) stand independent of each
other. This interpretation of Rule 401 suggests that regardless of
whether or not Rule 401(a) applies, Rule 401(b) always requires an
admonition regarding counsel and a transcript of the waiver proceedings whenever the criminal defendant may ultimately suffer
"serious consequences" as a result of that waiver.282
The authors submit a third possible approach, namely, one
which follows a plain reading of Rule 401(a). The statute clearly
states the "court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person
accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment" without first
275. Id.
276.

Id. at 357-58, 427 N.E.2d at 1384-85.

277. Id. at 360, 427 N.E.2d at 1386.
278. The appellate court did not quarrel with the State's ability to gain a revocation
of the probation but did conclude imprisonment therefor would violate the principles of

Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam) (a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction could not be used to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor theft to a felony
theft). McCarty, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 427 N.E.2d at 1385.
279. McCarty, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 427 N.E.2d at 1385.
280. Id. at 359-60, 427 N.E.2d at 1385-86.

281. See supra notes 248-65 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
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complying with Rule 401(a) and (b).28 3 The underlying rationale
of Rule 401 is to "eliminate any doubt that an accused understands
the nature and consequences of the charges. ' 284 It is the opinion of
the authors that the first position, limiting Rule 401(a) to situations
where the criminal defendant actually is incarcerated, defeats the
policy as well as the plain language of Rule 401. Further, it unnecessarily narrows the court's options in later sentencing the defendant to imprisonment if a valid waiver is not secured. The second
approach, applying the protections of Rule 401(a) through the
transcript requirements of Rule 401(b) when "serious consequences" will result from the waiver, may serve the policy of assuring that intelligent waivers exist but is at odds with the statutory
language. Further, it requires the trial court to engage in the often
impossible task of predicting whatever "serious consequences"
may result from a waiver of counsel with any particular defendant.
The third approach, complying with the plain meaning of the rule,

most closely serves the purpose of Rule 401. Rule 401(a) is, by
design, concerned with defendants facing a possible prison term
sometime in the future as a consequence of the plea at hand. Providing such defendants with a full understanding of the consequences of the waiver of counsel insures the integrity of the
proceedings and allows the trial court to maintain unhampered its
sentencing options. It is preferred, given the significance of the
right to the assistance of counsel,28 5 that Illinois courts follow the
plain meaning of Rule 401 even though the terms of the Rule exceeds, in some circumstances, the requirements of the federal
constitution.286
Once it is determined that Rule 401 applies to a defendant, the
next issue is to determine the extent to which the trial court must
comply with the admonitions of the rule. Rule 401(a) states that
"the court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused
of an offense.., without first.., informing him of and determining that he understands" the consequences of such waiver.287 Obviously, the statutory language is mandatory.
At first glance, it may seem important to contrast the mandatory
language of Rule 401 with that of Rule 402,28 which deals with
283.
284.
1983).
285.
286.
287.
288.

ILL. S. CT. R. 401, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 401.
People v. Kessler, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 354, 359, 447 N.E.2d 495, 499 (2d Dist.
U.S. CONsT. amend VI.
Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
ILL. S. Cr. R. 401(a), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A,para. 401(a) (emphasis added).
ILL. S. Cr. R. 402, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402.
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admonitions regarding the waiver of other rights when entering
guilty pleas. Only "substantial compliance" with Rule 402 is required.289 Conspicuous by its absence is similar "substantial compliance" language in Rule 401 regarding the waiver of counsel.
Accordingly, several appellate courts have attached significance to
the mandatory language of Rule 401 and the glaring omission of
the "substantial compliance" language which appears in Rule
402.290 Thus, the courts have held that there must be "rigorous
compliance" 291 or "strict compliance" 292 with the rule. However,
the Illinois Supreme Court recently ruled that only "substantial
compliance" with Rule 701 is required.293
Whether a trial court has adequately complied with Rule 701 is
best discerned by examining the case law. In Illinois, the courts
focus upon the following two factors:294 (1) whether the record reflects technical compliance with the rule, and, (2) whether the record reflects the defendant's actual knowledge of the consequences
of waiving counsel. 295 The trial judge "is required to conduct more
than a routine inquiry" when making the determination that the
defendant understands the consequences of his waiver.296 For example, in People v. Nieves,297 the Illinois Supreme Court was satisfied that there was sufficient compliance with Rule 401(a) when the
record showed the defendant wanted to represent himself and was
actually aware of the charge, the sentences available, and his right

to counsel. 298 In People v. Lyons,299 however, the appellate court
found noncompliance with Rule 401(a) where the only element in
289. Id.
290. See. e.g., People v. Derra, 92 111. App. 3d 1106, 1111, 416 N.E.2d 688, 691 (4th
Dist. 1981); People v. Brown, 80 Ill. App. 3d 616, 624, 399 N.E.2d 1374, 1380 (1st Dist.
1980).

291.
1980).
292.
1981).
293.

People v. Brown, 80 Ill. App. 3d 616, 626, 399 N.E.2d 1374, 1380 (1st Dist.
People v. Derra, 92 Il1.App. 3d 1106, 1111, 416 N.E.2d 688, 691 (4th Dist.
People v. Johnson, 119 111. 2d 119, 131-32, 518 N.E.2d 100, 106 (1987).

294. See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
295. Kessler, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 447 N.E.2d at 499. The Kessler court noted:
[T]he trial court must determine for itself whether the defendant has the requisite capacity to make an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to counsel.
The criteria generally utilized in making that decision are the defendant's age,
level of education, mental capacity and prior involvement, if any, in legal
proceedings.
Id. at 359, 447 N.E.2d at 499.
296. Id.
297. 92 111.2d 452, 442 N.E.2d 228 (1982).
298. Id. at 466, 442 N.E.2d at 235-36.
299. 19 Il1. App. 3d 294, 311 N.E.2d 370 (2d Dist. 1974).
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the common law record was a notation which read "Deft. advised
of his rights. ' ' 3°° This notation was deemed insufficient to show

that the defendant was advised of his right to counsel where nothing else in the record suggested an actual knowing waiver.30 '
B. Rule 402 -

Its Purpose and Scope

In addition to conforming with federal constitutional concerns,
all Illinois guilty plea hearings involving adult criminal defendants
must substantially comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule
402.302 The rule provides that a trial judge must personally admonish the defendant in open court about certain aspects and consequences of his guilty plea and determine if he understands such
aspects and consequences.30 3 First, the court must refer to the nature of the charge.3" 4 Second, it must consider potential sentence
possibilities. 30 5 Third, it must inquire into whether the defendant

understands the dimensions of his trial rights and the consequences
of his guilty plea as it waives such rights. 30 6 Beyond the admoni-

tions regarding the charge, sentence possibilities and rights waived,
3 7
the court also is obligated to determine if the plea is voluntary
and if a factual basis supports the plea.30 8 If the guilty plea is based
on a plea agreement, the terms of the agreement must be made part
of the record and the judge must indicate whether he concurs with
the agreement. 3 9 In addition, the Rule requires that these matters
be transcribed.3t0
According to the Committee Comments accompanying Rule
402, 3" the Illinois Supreme Court sought to accomplish two objectives when it promulgated the rule. First, the rule attempts to conform Illinois guilty plea hearings with due process requirements by
insuring an affirmative record is kept reflecting that the defendant
voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea.31 2 Second, the rule
300. Id. at 295, 311 N.E.2d at 371.
301. Id.
302. ILL. S.CT. R. 402, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 402.
303. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(a).
304. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 402(a)(1).
305. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(a)(2).
306. ILL. S.CT. R. 402(a)(3) & (a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I OA, paras. 402(a)(3) &
(a)(4).
307. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(b).
308. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(c).
309. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(dX2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 402(d)(2).
310. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 402(e).
311. ILL. S. CT. R. 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 402 (Smith-Hurd 1985),
Committee Comments, at 394-96.
312. Id.
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gives "visibility to the plea agreement process and thus provide[s]
the review court with a record containing an accurate and complete account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the guilty
3
plea.

31

Rule 402 applies to all proceedings involving an adult defendant
who enters a guilty plea to a crime, regardless of the nature of the
pending charges.314 Although the requirements of Rule 402 place
a substantial burden on high volume courts, Illinois has taken the
position that judicial economy
is better served by following the rule
315
in the first instance.
Notwithstanding the broad application of Rule 402, Illinois
courts have set forth limited exceptions that do not require compliance with the rule. For example, Rule 402 is inapplicable to juve3 17 It
nile delinquency proceedings 31 6 and contempt proceedings.
313. Id.
314. See People v. Sutherland, 128 I11.
App. 3d 415, 431-32, 470 N.E.2d 1210, 1222
(4th Dist. 1984).
315. With reference to the Rule 402 requirements, the Sutherland court stated:
Rule 402 admits of no exceptions based upon the nature of the charge. It applies with equal force to all pleas of guilty, whether to felonies or misdemeanors.
We are aware that this condition imposes a considerable burden on high volume
courts where the daily call may run upwards of a hundred cases or more in this
district, and even more in larger communities elsewhere. Nevertheless, the
rigor of the Rule must be satisfied.
Id. at 431-32, 470 N.E.2d at 1222.
See also People v. Williams, 125 Ill. App. 3d 284, 288, 465 N.E.2d 1044, 1046-47 (4th
Dist. 1984). In Williams, the defendant was found guilty of battery in a bench trial.
Defendant had signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. At no time during the
proceedings was the question of the jury waiver raised by the defendant or counsel. Defendant appealed citing noncompliance with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-6 (1983),
which stated that "[e]very person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by
jury unless understandingly waived by defendant in open court." Id.
The appellate court reversed the conviction. The defendant's waiver did not occur in
open court and the record was silent as to his comprehension of that right. The violation
of the statute governing waiver of a jury trial constitutedplain errorwhich was not waived
by defendant's failure to raise it at the trial level. The Court stated:
We are aware that many of the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963 place great burdens on high volume courts, such as traffic and misdemeanor tribunals. However, there are no safe shortcuts, and judicial economy
is better served by following the statute in the first instance.
Williams, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 288, 465 N.E.2d at 1046-47.
316. See In Interest of S.W.C., a Minor, 110 Il1. App. 3d 695, 442 N.E. 2d 961 (4th
Dist. 1982) (Rule 402 is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings; minors admission of guilt is
not the same as an adult guilty plea; lack of admonishments regarding incarceration is
not error). Accord In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 1016 (1978); In Interest of S.B., 128 II1.App. 3d 75, 470 N.E.2d 39 (1st Dist. 1984);
In Interest of L.E.J., 115 I11.
App. 3d 993, 451 N.E2d 289 (4th Dist. 1983).
But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701 (1985) (authorizing the extension of adult
criminal court protection to juvenile proceedings).
317. See People v. Mowery, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 452 N.E.2d 363 (4th Dist. 1983)
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has also been held that stipulated bench trials31" do not rise to the
level of a guilty plea proceeding and therefore do not necessitate
Rule 402 admonishments.319
Rule 402 applies only to a criminal defendant who enters a
guilty plea at the arraignment; it does not apply to proceedings
where the defendant enters a plea of not guilty. 320 In People v. Perez, 32 the defendant was charged with murder and rejected the
State's plea agreement offer.322 The defendant subsequently was
found guilty in a jury trial.323 On appeal, the defendant alleged
that the trial court erred in failing to admonish him regarding the
penalties authorized by law. 324 The court upheld the conviction,
stating Rule 402 provides that "the possible penalties must be
known to the defendant, on the record at the time of his plea of
guilty . . . . [This rule] does not address any other situation
(trial court in contempt proceeding did not err in not admonishing pro se defendant consistent with Rule 401 (waiver of counsel) and Rule 402 (entry of guilty pleas) because
these rules only apply to those accused of crimes contained within the Criminal Code of
1961).
318. A stipulated bench trial refers to a bench trial where all, or substantially all, of
the testimony that would have been presented by witnesses is agreed to between the parties. Such proceedings are normally used where the parties do not dispute the facts but
differ as to the applicability of certain law to the facts.
319. People v. Hancock, 113 Ill. App. 3d 564, 447 N.E.2d 994 (1st Dist. 1983). In
Hancock, the defendant was charged with the murder of her seven-month-old daughter.
The defendant allegedly threw her daughter into a lagoon. At a stipulated bench trial,
the trial court determined that the evidence, albeit circumstantial, warranted a finding of
guilty. On appeal, the defendant argued the stipulated bench trial was equivalent to entering a guilty plea and, therefore, she was entitled to the provisions of Rule 402. Id. at
573, 447 N.E.2d at 1000. The appellate court, affirming the conviction, responded,
"Where there is a stipulation as to the evidence which would be presented and defendant
preserves an actual or purported defense to the offense charged, admonitions pursuant to
...
Rule 402 ... are not required." Id. The court reasoned that the defendant had
stipulated only to the evidence presented, not to her guilt or innocence. Id. Accord People v. Sampson, 130 I11.App. 3d 438, 473 N.E.2d 1002 (4th Dist. 1985); People v. Daminski, 80 I1. App. 3d 903, 400 N.E.2d 708 (5th Dist. 1980); People v. Stinette, 49 I11.App.
3d 134, 363 N.E.2d 945 (2d Dist. 1977); People v. Ford, 44 Ill. App. 3d 94, 357 N.E.2d
865 (4th Dist. 1976); People v. Ruas, 31 11. App. 3d 385, 334 N.E.2d 108 (1st Dist.
1975); People v. Fair, 29 Ill. App. 3d 939, 332 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1975); People v.
Young, 25 Ill. App. 3d 629, 323 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist. 1975). But see People v. Bonham,
106 I11. App. 3d 769, 436 N.E.2d 269 (3d Dist. 1982). This court stated: "[a]dmonishing
the defendant would eliminate the confusion and misunderstanding that the procedure
creates. Ideally, the record should reflect the defendant's understanding of the procedures about to the employed against him and that his appeal of any resulting conviction
will be limited to the issues he is preserving." Id. at 773, 436 N.E.2d at 272.
320. People v. Perez, 113 Ill. App. 3d 143, 446 N.E.2d 1229 (1st Dist. 1983).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 146, 446 N.E.2d at 1232.
323. Id. at 145, 446 N.E.2d at 1231.
324. Id. at 150, 446 N.E.2d at 1234-35.

1988]

Guilty Plea Proceedings

.... ."I" Thus, Rule 402 violations cannot be advanced after conviction following a trial.
C

The "SubstantialCompliance" Standard of Rule 402
1. The Meaning of "Substantial Compliance"

Rule 402 provides that in hearings on pleas of guilty, there must
be "substantial compliance" with the aforementioned procedures.326 This section will examine Illinois courts' interpretation of
this important standard. Further, this section will inquire into the
adequacy of procedural devices such as written forms, mass admonishments by the trial court, and extra-judicial admonishments.
Such procedures have been employed by Illinois trial courts as
either a substitute for the duties imposed upon the trial court by
Rule 402, or as an abbreviated form of those duties.
Case law provides a sense of the parameters of the "substantial
compliance" standard. In 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court stated
that Rule 402 requires "only substantial, not literal compliance
with its provisions. 327 Similarly, in People v. Hickman,328 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District called for "substantial"
rather than "total" compliance with Rule 402.329 Thus, failure to
comply strictly with all aspects of the provisions of Rule 402 will
not necessarily render void a conviction following a guilty plea.
In People v. Miller,3 ° the court found substantial compliance
with Rule 402 despite the defendant's allegation that the trial court
failed to admonish the defendant of the minimum and maximum
sentences of the offense at the defendant's arraignmenta 3 ' The record in Miller revealed that (1) the defendant was in open court
with retained counsel; 3 2 (2) the State made reference to the minimum and maximum sentence on the charges during the arraign325. Id. at 150, 446 N.E.2d at 1235.
326. ILL. S. Cr. R. 402, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 402 (1985) (emphasis
added).
327. People v. Stewart, 101 Ill.
2d 470, 484, 463 N.E.2d 677, 684, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 920, reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984).
328. 9 Ill. App. 3d 39, 291 N.E.2d 523 (3d Dist. 1973).
329. Id. at 42, 291 N.E.2d at 525. Accord People v. Roebuck, 10 Il. App. 3d 641,
295 N.E.2d 32 (Ist Dist. 1973); People v. Talbot, 9 I1. App. 3d 688, 292 N.E.2d 561 (3d
Dist. 1973). See also the following cases requiring substantial, not literal, compliance
with Rule 402: People v. Clem, 72 I1. App. 3d 163, 390 N.E.2d 615 (2d Dist. 1979);
People v. Lee, 33 I1. App. 3d 45, 337 N.E.2d 381 (Ist Dist. 1975); People v. Starks, 30
Ill. App. 3d 541, 333 N.E.2d 531 (2d Dist. 1975).
330. 2 Ill.
App. 3d 851, 277 N.E.2d 898 (2d Dist. 1972).
331. Id. at 852-53, 277 N.E.2d at 898-900.
332. Id. at 852, 277 N.E.2d at 899.
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ment;333 (3) the defendant was fully advised of his other rights; 334
and (4) the defendant did not contend that he did not understand
the possible sentences. 335 Despite the trial court's omissions of the
provisions outlined in Rule 402, the appellate court determined
that there was "substantial compliance" with the rule. 3 6
A similar result was reached in People v. Krouse.33 In Krouse,
the defendant was admonished at his arraignment that the State
carried the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. 338 The defendant contended on appeal that because he was
not specifically informed by the court that (1) he had a right to
plead not guilty and (2) that he was waiving the right to a trial and
the right to confront his accuser by entering a guilty plea, Rule 402
was violated. 339 The appellate court held that there was "substantial compliance" with Rule 402. 340 The court stated that lack of
specific admonitions at a guilty plea proceeding does not, by itself,
indicate that the defendant was unaware of the consequences of his
plea.341 Such omissions, therefore, are not necessarily fatal to the
proceeding.342 Thus, it appears that unless the defendant can claim
he was actually ignorant of the rights he waived by pleading guilty,
his assertions of prejudice will be discounted.343
The foregoing cases reveal that not every admonishment enunciated in Rule 402 must be delivered to the defendant in open court
in order for the proceeding to comply substantially with Rule 402.
In People v. Bennett,34 the court articulated the standard against
which "substantial compliance" was to be measured. In Bennett,
the trial judge failed to admonish the defendant about the nature of
the charge. 345 The appellate court asserted that the entire record
may be considered to ascertain whether the defendant understood
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.

336. Id. at 852-53, 277 N.E.2d at 899-900.
337. 7 Il. App. 3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543 (5th Dist. 1972).
338. Id. at 757, 288 N.E.2d at 546.

339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. (citing People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill. 2d 371, 270 N.E.2d 30 (1971)).
342. Krouse, 7 Il1.App. 3d at 757, 288 N.E.2d at 546.
343. See, eg., People v. Lumley, 76 Ill. App. 3d 221, 394 N.E.2d 1079 (2d Dist.
1979); People v. James, 51 Ill. App. 3d 541, 366 N.E.2d 1082 (1st Dist. 1977); People v.
Burgess, 34 Ill. App. 3d 966, 342 N.E.2d 407 (2d Dist. 1975).
344. 82 Ill. App. 3d 596, 403 N.E.2d 50 (5th Dist. 1980).
345. The defendant claimed the trial court failed to (1) admonish him of the nature of

the charge, (2) advise him he could be convicted of a lesser included offense, (3) advise
him he could persist in a plea of not guilty, and (4) inquire into the voluntariness of his
plea. Id. at 599, 403 N.E.2d at 54.
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the nature of the charges.346 The court held that there is "substantial compliance" if an ordinary person in the circumstances of the
defendant would understand the charges.347 In the situation at issue, the defendant was informed of the charge by name and the
State's Attorney summarized what the evidence would prove.348
The court therefore concluded that the entire record demonstrated
that the defendant did understand the nature of the offense involved even though each element of the offense was not mentioned
explicitly.349
The difference between compliance and noncompliance with
Rule 402 is merely a matter of degree. The greater the number of
omissions by the trial judge, the greater is the likelihood that there
has been no "substantial compliance." For instance, in People v.
Waldorf,"0 the appellate court reversed a conviction because the
guilty plea proceeding did not comply substantially with Rule
402.351 The defendant in Waldorf pleaded guilty to three counts of
aggravated battery and was sentenced to five years probation.352
Thereafter, with new counsel, the defendant sought to vacate the
plea; the court denied this motion. 3 On appeal, the defendant
contended that the lower court did not comply substantially with
Rule 402 inasmuch as the transcript revealed that the defendant
was not advised (1) of his right to plead not guilty and persist in
that plea, (2) that if he pleaded guilty there would be no trial, and
(3) that he was waiving his right to confront the witnesses against
him. 54 In addition, the defendant alleged that the trial court failed
to state in open court the terms of the plea agreement and his con35
currence to the agreement as required by Rule 402(d). In reviewing the conviction, the court held that given the significant constitutional rights at issue, and given the fact that the trial
court failed to inform the defendant of the consequences of waiver
of these rights in the event a guilty plea is accepted, the trial court
clearly erred.35 6 The court then concluded that these omissions,
346. Id.
347. Id.
348.

Id. at 599-600, 403 N.E.2d at 54.

349. Id. at 600, 403 N.E.2d at 54 (failure of trial court to mention element of specific
intent).
350.

94 I1. App. 3d 976, 419 N.E.2d 428 (1st Dist. 1981).

351. Id. at 980-82, 419 N.E.2d at 431-33.
352. Id. at 977, 419 N.E.2d at 429.
353. Id. at 978-80, 419 N.E.2d at 430-31.
354. Id. at 981, 419 N.E.2d at 432.

355. Id.
356. Id.
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combined with the defendant's claim the plea was coerced unlawfully, permitted withdrawal of the guilty plea.357
35 8 the defendant pleaded guilty to drivIn People v. Sutherland,
ing under the influence of intoxicating beverages and was sentenced to a jail term. 359 During trial, the judge failed to admonish
personally the defendant that (1) he had the right to plead not
guilty and persist in that plea, and (2) if he did plead guilty, such
plea would effectively waive his constitutional rights to a jury trial
and to confront his accusers.3W On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court failed to advise him that the court was
not bound by the terms of the plea agreement arranged between
the prosecutors and the defendant and that the court could impose
a sentence different from that agreed to by the parties. 361 The defendant's plea agreement contemplated that no jail term would
result.362

Following an extensive review of the case law,3 63 the appellate
court held that the trial court violated the protective measures prescribed by Rule 402.364 The record in Sutherland revealed only
that the trial court inquired whether defense counsel had fully informed the defendant of his constitutional rights.3 6 Although defense counsel had assured the trial judge that the defendant had
been fully informed, the appellate court did not find this to be satisfactory because counsel's statement to the defendant did not disclose "the scope of the admonition. ' ' 366 The appellate court added
that the record was ambiguous as to whether the defendant actually understood what rights he waived by pleading guilty. 367 Finally, the court stated that it was not clear whether the defendant
understood the court's right to ignore the arranged plea agreement. 36 Thus, the Sutherlandcourt held that the trial court's failure to admonish the defendant pursuant to Rule 402, in addition to
the fact that the record failed to reveal the defendant's knowledge
of his rights and the consequences of entering a guilty plea, ren357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 982, 419 N.E.2d at 433.
128 IM.App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210 (4th Dist. 1984).
Id. at 415, 470 N.E.2d at 1211.
Id. at 418, 470 N.E.2d at 1213.
Id.
Id. at 416, 470 N.E.2d at 1212.
Id. at 419-26, 470 N.E.2d at 1214-21.

364. Id. at 426, 470 N.E.2d at 1221.
365.
366.

Id. at 426, 470 N.E.2d at 1218.
Id.

367. Id. at 428, 470 N.E.2d at 1219-20.
368. Id. at 429-31, 470 N.E.2d at 1220-21.

Guilty Plea Proceedings

1988]

dered the guilty plea invalid.369
In summary, to determine whether a guilty plea proceeding substantially complies with Rule 402, the Illinois courts examine the
entire record. Illinois courts apply an objective standard; the test is
whether an ordinary person in the circumstances of the defendant
would understand the charges against him, the constitutional
rights afforded him, and the waiver of those rights which are inherent whenever his guilty plea is accepted by the court. Appellate
courts focus on the apparent knowledge of the defendant at the
time of the plea rather than on literal compliance with the rule.
When the record reflects a voluntary and intelligent plea, most Illinois courts conclude that Rule 402 is complied with substantially.
2.

Alternatives to Oral Admonishments
of Individual Defendants

Substantial compliance with Rule 402 imposes a considerable
burden on high-volume courts.370 In an effort to reduce the time
that Rule 402 consumes in the trial courts, some alternative
schemes have been employed from time to time. These procedures,
such as written forms, mass admonishments, and extra-judicial admonitions, however, have met with mixed reactions from the appellate courts.
Although some of these alternative schemes may serve the interests protected by Rule 402,71 the courts insist that the constitutional rights of the accused at a guilty plea proceeding carry37a2
higher value than judicial economy even in high-volume courts.
In order for an appellate court to evaluate whether the trial judge
substantially complied with Rule 402, it must be able to examine
the trial court record. 7 Without a complete record, the appellate
court lacks a sufficient basis from which to render its determination and will normally assume noncompliance with the rule. 7 4
The use of a written form signed by the defendant acknowledging that he fully understands the consequences of entering a guilty
plea, the nature of the charge, and the constitutional rights waived
369.
370.
371.

Id. at 426-28, 470 N.E.2d at 1219-20.
Id. at 432, 470 N.E.2d at 1222.
See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.

372. The court stated that it "was ... aware that this conditon imposes a considerable burden on high-volume courts ....
[but] the rigor of the Rule must be satisfied."
Sutherland, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 432, 470 N.E.2d at 1222.

373. Id.
374. See, e.g., People v. Newbern, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1038, 307 N.E.2d 439, 440
(4th Dist. 1974).
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in the proceeding does not constitute substantial compliance with
Rule 402.
For example, in People v. Cummings,376 the court
held that a circuit court judge may not substitute a printed form
for the oral admonitions mandated pursuant to Rule 402.
On
the other hand, in high-volume courts, such as traffic court, mass
admonishments may be employed to alleviate the time consumed
by Rule 402.378 For example, in People v. Henderson,379 the appellate court upheld the use of mass admonishments in traffic court.380
The defendant had pleaded guilty to driving with a revoked or suspended license and was sentenced to jail.3 1 The traffic court judge
delivered admonishments en masse to all the defendants pleading
guilty.38 2 These admonishments reviewed the constitutional rights
afforded all defendants. 83 The traffic court judge also informed
each defendant individually regarding the specific consequences of
entering a guilty plea in his specific situation.384 The court informed the defendant, Henderson, individually of the nature of the
charges filed against him and the possible minimum and maximum
penalties. 8 5 Finally, the'traffic court judge learned from the defendant whether (1) he wished to plead guilty; (2) he understood
the admonishments; (3) he had any questions concerning the
waiver of his constitutional rights; and (4) his plea was
voluntary.386
On appeal the defendant argued that the traffic court judge did
not comply with Rule 402 because he failed to explain the constitutional rights afforded all defendants.38 7 The appellate court, how375.

See, e.g., People v. Carle, 8 Ill. App. 3d 56, 288 N.E.2d 876 (3d Dist. 1972).

376. 7 Ill. App. 3d 306, 287 N.E. 2d 291 (2d Dist. 1972).
377. Id. at 308, 287 N.E.2d at 293. Similarly, the courts have held that a trial court's
mere utilization of jury waiver forms does not effectuate a valid waiver of a jury trial.
See, e.g., People v. Feliciano, 93 Ill. App. 3d 642, 417 N.E.2d 824 (1st Dist. 1981); People
v. Myles, 83 Ill. App. 3d 843, 404 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 86
Ill. 2d 260, 427 N.E.2d 59 (1980); People v. Rambo, 123 11. App. 2d 299, 260 N.E.2d
119 (1st Dist. 1970).
378. The Sutherland court noted that "[t]hrough the use of checklists on the bench,

admonitions en masse where necessitated in high volume courts,... and other similar
procedures, pleas of guilty to lesser offenses may be expeditiously handled." Sutherland,
128 11. App. 3d at 432, 470 N.E.2d at 1222.
379. 104 Ill. App. 3d 62, 432 N.E,2d 660 (4th Dist. 1982).
380. Id. at 63-64, 432 N.E.2d at 660-61.
381. Id. at 62-63, 432 N.E.2d at 660.
382. Id. at 63, 432 N.E.2d at 660-61.

383.

The trial judge admonished the various defendants about the consequences of

their pleas, their right to a jury trial, and their right to testify on their own behalf. Id.
384. Id. at 63, 432 N.E.2d at 661.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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ever, affirmed the conviction and expressed approval of mass
admonishments as employed in this situation.3 81 The appellate
court noted that the lower court had dealt with each defendant
individually regarding the particular consequences of entering a
guilty plea which were unique to him. Accordingly, the appellate
court found that the mass admonitions respecting the general constitutional rights afforded all defendants substantially complied
with Rule 402.389
Another procedure that reduces the time consumed by Rule 402
is allowing the prosecutor or defense attorney rather than the trial
judge to admonish the defendant. 390 Generally, where the prosecutor or defense attorney admonishes the accused in the presence of
the trial judge and the trial judge is satisfied that the plea is voluntary and intelligent, there is substantial compliance with Rule
402. 39t
In People v. Larrabee,92 the prosecutor admonished the defendant in the trial judge's presence.393 The judge asked the defendant
if he understood the prosecutor's statements.394 The defendant replied affirmatively. 395 The appellate court affirmed the conviction
stating that there was substantial compliance with Rule 402 when
the trial court "incorporated by reference" the admonitions offered
by the prosecutor.396
Similarly, in People v. Torres,397 the accused was admonished by
his own counsel in the trial judge's presence. 39 The appellate
court approved the admonishment. 399 Thus, when admonitions are
given to the accused by an attorney from either side, Rule 402 is
satisfied if a review of the entire trial court record by the appellate
court supports the conclusion that the plea was voluntary and
intelligent.4w
388. Id.
389. Id.
390.
1972).

See, e.g., People v. Larrabee, 7 I11.App. 3d 726, 288 N.E.2d 538 (5th Dist.

391.

Id

392.
393.
394.

7 Ill. App. 3d 726, 288 N.E.2d 538 (5th Dist. 1972).
Id. at 727-28, 288 N.E.2d at 539-40.
Id. at 729, 288 N.E.2d at 540.

395. Id.
396. Id.
397. 7 I11. App. 3d 395, 287 N.E.2d 487 (2d Dist. 1972).
398. Id. at 397-98, 287 N.E.2d at 489.
399. Id. at 399, 287 N.E.2d at 490.
400. People v. English, 42 II1.App. 3d 958, 960, 356 N.E.2d 856, 858-59 (Ist Dist.
1976) (defense attorney's explanation of charge and sanction supported substantial compliance with Rule 402).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

Non-judicial admonitions supplemented by judicial inquiry were
approved by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Krantz. ° 1 In
Krantz, the prosecutor's litany of anticipated evidence during the
guilty plea proceeding clarified what criminal conduct the State expected to prove. The trial court then directly inquired of the accused as to whether he understood the nature of the charge. °2
Having received the accused's assurance that he understood the
charge, in addition to the reasons why he committed the offense of
forgery, the trial court determined that the defendant understood
the nature of the charge.4 3 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
plea after finding substantial compliance with Rule 402.404
The substantial compliance standard permits the prosecutor or
defense attorney to assume a portion of the judge's admonitory role
to the extent that the non-judicial admonitions are in court and on
the record. The substantial compliance standard does not, however, admit out-of-court non-judicial admonitions. °5 In People v.
Sutherland,"0 the appellate court ruled that the accused received
insufficient protection afforded by Rule 402 when the trial court
merely elicited from defense counsel that he had informed the defendant of the nature of the charge, the prescribed penalties, and
the trial rights waived by entering a guilty plea. ° 7 The court observed that in Sutherland, the defense counsel did not admonish
the defendant in open court in the judge's presence. 408 Consequently, no record was made of the content and scope of defense
counsel's admonishments to his client.409 Furthermore, the Sutherland court emphasized that the trial judge failed to question the
defendant to determine whether he understood what defense counsel had told him. °
D.

Rule 402 Admonitions Regarding Charge

Rule 402(a)(1) addresses the trial judge's obligation to admonish
401.
402.

58 Ill. 2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559 (1974).
Id. at 193, 317 N.E.2d at 561.

403. Id.
404.
405.

Id. at 193-95, 317 N.E.2d at 562-63.
See, e.g., People v. Weakley, 45 Ill. 2d 549, 553-54, 259 N.E.2d at 802, 804-05

(1970) (trial court could not properly rely on defense counsel's possible explanation of
minimum and maximum sentence to the accused).
406. 128 Ill. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210. See supra notes 358.69 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of Sutherland.
407. Sutherland, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 418-28, 470 N.E.2d at 1212-22.

408. Id.
409. Id.
410.

Id.
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the defendant about the charge against him. 4 " This rule requires
that the trial court personally address the defendant,1 2 that the
admonition be in open court, 3 that the trial court inform the defendant of the nature of the charge,' 1 ' and that the trial court determine the defendant understands the charges. 4 5 These must be
read in light of the "substantial compliance" standard set forth in
Rule 402.416
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Stewart," measured
"substantial compliance" with the admonishment requirement in
light of the defendant's apparent ability to understand the nature
of the charge.418 In Stewart, the court stated that the entire record
may be considered in ascertaining whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge. 4 9 In Stewart, the defense counsel
stated that he had advised the accused "at length" about the "consequences" of his guilty plea.420 Additionally, both the accused
and his attorney did not protest and, indeed, acquiesced in the recital of the State's statement of facts which demonstrated the accused's conduct fell within the charges to which he pleaded
guilty. 42' Further, the accused was admonished of the charges in
open court at his earlier arraignment. 22 Finally, the defendant did
not claim that he did not understand the charges.423 Rather, he
complained that the trial judge erred in not explaining the charges
to him personally; the court found that this fact did not undermine
its finding of substantial compliance.' 2 '
Stewart, in effect, seriously undermines the requirement of Rule
402(a)(1) that the trial judge personally admonish the defendant
about the charge in open court prior to accepting the guilty plea.
Based on (1) the defense counsel's pledge that the accused was in411. Rule 402(a)(1) provides in relevant part that "[t]he court shall not accept a plea
of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing
him of and determining that he understands the ...nature of the charge ....ILL. S. CT.
R. 402(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 402(a)(1) (1985).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677 (1984).
417. 101 Ill.
418. Id. at 483-86, 463 N.E.2d at 684-85.
2d 187, 317
419. Id. at 484, 463 N.E.2d at 684 (quoting People v. Krantz, 58 Ill.
N.E.2d 559 (1974)).
2d at 485, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
420. Stewart, 101 Ill.
421. Id. at 486, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
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formed of the nature of the charges,425 (2) the silence and subsequent acquiescence of the defendant and defense counsel as to the
factual basis established by the state,426 (3) the prior admonishment
to the accused of the charges at the arraignment, 27 and (4) the trial
court's compliance with most of the remaining aspects of Rule
402,428 the Illinois Supreme Court was satisfied there was substantial compliance with Rule 402.429 This approach to Rule 402, however, has disturbing potential. First, the Stewart court appeared to
be concerned only with substantial compliance with Rule 402 as a
whole rather than if there was substantial compliance with Rule
402(a)(1) and its requirement pertaining to admonishing the defendant about the charge.430 Second, it tolerated the type of out-ofcourt non-judicial admonishment, condemned in Sutherland,'431

which failed to reflect the scope of the admonition. 32 Third, it
appears to minimize the importance of the general policy considerations behind the rule, namely, to assure the appellate court on the
record that the defendant actually understood the true dimensions
of the charge.433
In any event, there are other Illinois decisions, such as People v.
Trinka,'3 ' in which the reviewing court reflects more concern with
the issue of whether the defendant understood the charge than
with the issue as to whether the trial court has faithfully followed
the terms of the rule. 35 In Trinka, the defense counsel stated in
open court in the accused's presence that he had reviewed the information with the accused and that the accused thereafter acknowledged that this was true. 36 The court then asked the
defendant if he had any questions before he entered his plea; the
425. Id. at 485, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
426. Id. at 486, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
427. Id.
428. It had, for instance, admonished the defendant about his constitutional rights, as
well as the maximum sentence and established a factual basis, whereas it had not mentioned the minimum sentence or inquired into whether the plea was voluntary. Id. at 48183, 463 N.E.2d at 682-83.
429. Id. at 483-87, 463 N.E.2d at 683-86.
430. Id.
431. See supra notes 406-10 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Sulherland
could be distinguished because the defendant in that case had not been the subject of an
earlier judicial admonishment about the charge as was the case in Stewart.
432. See supra notes 406-10 and accompanying text.
433. Although the Stewart opinion states the judge asked the defendant "if he understood the severity of the charges," there is no indication that it determined if the defendant understood the nature thereof. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d at 481, 463 N.E.2d at 682.
434. 10 I11.App. 3d 183, 293 N.E.2d 179 (3d Dist. 1973).
435. Id. at 185, 293 N.E.2d at 181-82.
436. Id. at 184, 293 N.E.2d at 181.
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defendant replied that he did not.4 37 The appellate court held that
the defendant had been advised adequately of the nature of the
charge.438
Illinois courts consider an admonishment sufficient under Rule
402 when the trial court admonishes the accused about the charge
by referring to the offense by name only.4 39 For example, in People
v. Robinson,44 the defendant argued that he was not admonished
properly as to the nature of the charge against him when the trial
court merely referred to the charge as "rape" without setting forth
the essential elements of the offense." 1 In Robinson, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated, as in Stewart, that it would consider the
entire record in determining whether the trial court properly informed the accused of the nature of the charge." 2 The court held
that Rule 402 was complied with substantially considering the fact
that the defendant was represented by counsel and that his plea
was entered pursuant to a plea agreement." 3 The court stated that
a detailed exposition of the essential elements of the crime was not
necessary to insure that the defendant understood the nature of the
charge. 4 "
Central to establishing that the accused understands the nature
of the charge is a dialogue between the trial judge and the defendant.445 In People v. Warship,446 the trial court provided the defendant with a copy of the indictment." 7 In addition, the judge recited
almost all of the essential elements of the crime on the record in
open court and, accordingly, the appellate court found no violation
437.
438.
439.
offense

Id. at 185, 293 N.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 185, 293 N.E.2d at 181-82.
People v. Krantz, 58 Il1. 2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559 (1974) (trial court described
as "forgery"); People v. Hopson, 101 11. App. 3d 564, 428 N.E.2d 680 (2d Dist.

1981) (trial court failed to inform accused of intent requirement for murder; substantial
compliance with Rule 402 established); People v. Burgess, 34 I1. App. 3d 966, 342
N.E.2d 407 (2d Dist. 1975) (substantial compliance with Rule 402 despite trial court's
failure to mention specific intent requirement for aggravated battery); People v. Trenter,
3 Ill. App. 3d 889, 279 N.E.2d 130 (2d Dist, 1972) (substantial compliance with Rule 402
established where trial court simply referred to the offense as "burglary").
440. 63 111. 2d 141, 345 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
441. Id. at 144, 345 N.E.2d at 466.
442. Id. at 146, 345 N.E.2d at 467.

443. Id.
444. Id. at 145, 345 N.E.2d at 467.
445. Rule 402 specifically provides that "[t]he court shall... [address] the defendant
personally in open court... and [determine) that he understands the.., nature of the
charge ... " ILL. S. CT. R. 402(aX1), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 402(a)(1) (1985).
446. 6 Il1.App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (2d Dist. 1972).
447. Id. at 463, 285 N.E.2d at 226.
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of Rule 402.'8 On the other hand, providing the defendant with a
copy of the indictment, without more, is insufficient to inform the
defendant of the nature of the charge." 9
It appears from these cases that the Illinois courts, with the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court, assume the defendant has an
understanding of the nature of the charges if the judge in open
court explains the crime in question at some earlierpoint in the
proceedings.450 When the state establishes a factual basis supportive of the charge without objection from the accused, the court
assumes he understands the charge.451 When the defendant's attorney advises the court that he or she has explained the charge to the
accused, some Illinois decisions consider this to be an adequate assurance that the defendant understands. 5 2 When the accused is
represented by counsel and the trial court makes reference to the
offense by name only, it normally will be assumed that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, even though no reference is made to the elemental composition of the crime.453 In any
event, it is the opinion of the authors, which is supported by Justice
Simon's dissent in Stewart,454 that opinions such as Stewart, which
concentrate on the defendant's apparent understanding of the
charge rather than the judge's obligation to insure the defendant's
actual understanding, undercut the Boykin and Rule 402 requirement that the record of the guilty plea proceeding reflect an affirmative showing by the trial judge that the defendant's plea is truly
448. Id. at 463-64, 285 N.E.2d at 227.
449. People v. Ingeneri, 7 111. App. 3d 809, 811, 288 N.E.2d 550, 551 (5th Dist. 1972)
(dicta). See also People v. Porter, 61 Ill.
App. 3d 941, 378 N.E.2d 788 (4th Dist. 1978)
(noncompliance with Rule 402 where trial court merely referred to the offense by its file
number; the defendant cannot be held to understand the nature of the charge confronting
him by reference to the file number alone).
450. Stewart, 101 Ill.
2d at 486, 463 N.E.2d at 685. Justice Simon's dissent points out
the trial judge read the indictment to the defendant at his arraignment more than five
months earlier, which he considered inadequate because there was no inquiry at that
point as to whether he understood the charge. Id. at 500, 463 N.E.2d at 692 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
451. Id. at 486, 463 N.E.2d at 685. However, Simon pointed pointed out "[t]he defendant's silence at this stage of the proceedings can hardly be equated with an understanding of the nature of the charges." Id. at 503, 463 N.E.2d at 693 (Simon, J.,
dissenting). Stewart is especially troublesome in this regard because the "factual basis
was not recited until after the guilty plea had been accepted, and it therefore could not
have assisted the defendant in understanding the nature of the charges at the time he
entered his plea." Id.
452. Id.at 485-86, 463 N.E.2d at 677. But see Sutherland, supra notes 406-10 and
accompanying text (appellate court held this practice to be inadequate).
453. See supra notes 439-44 and accompanying text.
454. Stewart, 101 Il1. 2d at 499-503, 463 N.E.2d at 691-93 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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intelligent. 4 "
E. Rule 402 Admonitions Regarding Sentence
The Illinois Criminal Code provides that if a defendant pleads
guilty, such plea shall not be accepted until the court has explained
to the defendant the "maximum penalty" required by law.45 6
Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) provides an additional requirement.4 " Pursuant to Rule 402(a)(2), the court must inform the
defendant pleading guilty of "the minimum and maximum sentence," including those sentences required because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences. 458 The Committee Comments
accompanying the rule explain that the defendant pleading guilty
459
should have a "realistic picture of what might happen to him.
This section will examine the scope of these statutory sentencing
admonition requirements in light of relevant Illinois case law.
First, admonitions regarding the range of sentencing possibilities
will be considered including whether the trial court must inform
the defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences and
whether the trial court is required to list the mandatory supervised
release terms 46° prescribed by law. Second, a discussion of the
"collateral consequences" doctrine will follow. This doctrine involves the extent to which the trial court must inform the defendant of all the consequences, direct or collateral, of pleading guilty.
Of course, the sufficiency of the sentencing admonitions is reviewed
by reference to the substantial compliance standard. As stated,
Rule 402(a)(2) requires a trial court judge to advise the defendant
pleading guilty of the minimum and maximum sentences for the
offense charged. Whether a trial court substantially complied with
this admonition mandate, however, requires an examination of all
circumstances surrounding the guilty plea proceeding at issue.
In the Illinois Supreme Court decision of People v. Walker,"'
the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of murder and one
count of armed robbery and was sentenced by a jury to death. 462
455. See id. at 501, 463 N.E.2d at 692 (Simon, J.,dissenting) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); People v. Walker, 84 11. 2d 512, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981)).
456. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 113.4(c) (1985).
457. ILL. S. Cr. R. 402(aX2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 402(a)(2) (1985).
458. Id. (emphasis added).
459. ILL. S. Cr. R. 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402 (Smith-Hurd 1985),
Committee Comments at 394.
460. Mandatory supervised release is the successor of what was previously known as
parole.
461. People v. Waiker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 488 N.E.2d 529 (1985).
462. Id. at 490, 488 N.E.2d at 531.
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On appeal, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred in admonishing the defendant of the sentences prescribed by law.4 3
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the court erroneously told
the defendant that (1) the two murder counts would be considered
separately in sentencing and that the defendant could be sentenced
on each count from twenty years imprisonment to imposition of
the death penalty, and (2) that it had discretion to enhance or
double any term of years imposed and that one possible sentence
was natural life imprisonment." 4 The defendant argued that this
advice was erroneous because certain case law" 5 required, at a
minimum, a natural life sentence for two murders.' The defendant claimed the admonition that he might receive a term of years
was misleading because he was pleading guilty to two murders.
Consequently, the defendant contended that the plea was involuntary and unintelligent." 7
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that
the plea was involuntary or unintelligent." 8 The court focused
upon the fact that the case law upon which the defendant based his
argument did not apply to situations occuring during the time of
the defendant's sentencing hearing." 9 Further, the record revealed
that the defendant was aware that the prosecutor was seeking the
death penalty before he entered his guilty pleas. 470 The court
found that the defendant was not misled and, accordingly, the
pleas were voluntary and intelligent.47 ' It stated that the trial
with Rule 402 and that the defendant
court substantially complied 472
was not denied due process.
In People v. Stewart,47 3 the defendant entered a guilty plea to two
463.
464.

Id. at 496, 488 N.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 496-97, 488 N.E.2d at 534.

465. Id. The defendant argued that according to People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201,
464 N.E.2d 1059 (1984), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled Illinois law mandated that a

sentence not less than natural life imprisonment upon conviction of murdering more than
one person. This ruling, however, was not in effect when the defendant was sentenced.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 496-97, 488 N.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 497, 488 N.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 497-99, 488 N.E.2d at 534-36.
Id. at 497-98, 488 N.E.2d at 534.
Id. at 499, 488 N.E.2d at 535.
Id. at 498-99, 488 N.E.2d at 535-36.
Id. The court stated that:

[t]his court has held that the requirements of Rule 402 need only be substantially, as the rule states, complied with to satisfy the requirements for due process. The entire record will be considered to determine whether the defendant
understood the nature of the charge or charges to which he was pleading.
Id. at 498-99, 488 N.E.2d at 535.

473.

101 Ill. 2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677 (1984).
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counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count
of armed robbery. 474 Following his guilty plea, the defendant was
sentenced to death.4" On appeal, the defendant argued that the
minimum and maximum penalties were not explained adequately
to him and that the guilty pleas, therefore, did not comport with
Rule 402(a)(2). 47 6 Notwithstanding Rule 402(a)(2), the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the pleas and sentence.47 The court explained that the record indicated the defendant had been informed
of the possible death penalty which subsequently was imposed. 7 8
The court maintained that Rule 402(a)(2) does not require "a recital of all the possible sentencing situations that might arise.

' 47 9

In

conclusion, the court determined that there was no failure on the
part of the trial judge to substantially comply with Rule 402 simply
because he did not ceremoniously inform the defendant of all the
lesser sentences which possibly could be imposed. 8 °
In People v. Nichols,81 the court considered the issue of whether
a defendant pleading guilty must be admonished fully regarding
the maximum penalty even if there is no real chance of the imposition of the maximum sentence. 8 2 In Nichols, the defendant
pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for the State's promise not to
seek the death penalty or natural life imprisonment, and not to
recommend any specific sentence to the trial court.483 The defendant was sentenced to thirty-nine years imprisonment.' 8 ' On appeal, the defendant contended that his guilty plea was involuntary
inasmuch as he was led to believe that the death penalty was a
viable sentence as a consequence of the trial judge's admonishment
about this possibility. 4'85 The defendant argued that the trial court
misrepresented the law and, thus, unduly encouraged him to plead
guilty. 48 6 The defendant believed that the absence of evidence of
aggravating factors,487 made it unlikely that he receive the death
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. at 473, 463
Id. at 474, 463
Id. at 483, 463
Id. at 487, 463
Id. at 486, 463

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at
at

679.
679.
683.
685.
685.

479. Id.
480. Id. at 487, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
481. 96 11. App. 3d 354, 420 N.E.2d 1166 (2d Dist. 1981).
482. Id. at 355-56, 420 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
483. Id. at 355, 420 N.E.2d at 1167.

484. id.
485. Id. at 355-56, 420 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 356, 420 N.E.2d at 1168.
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penalty.488
The appellate court rejected this argument 489 and affirmed the
conviction. 490 The court reasoned that Rule 402(a)(2) requires the
trial court to inform the defendant pleading guilty of the minimum
and maximum penalties prescribed by law. 491 According to the
Nichols court, the trial court's obligation to mention possible
sentences extended even to the remote possibility of the death penalty.492 Furthermore, an allegation of fear of possibly receiving the
death penalty is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise voluntary
and intelligent plea.493 The defendant must be admonished about
the maximum penalty, even if there is no real chance the maximum
sentence will be imposed. 494
In People v. Lundeen, 95 the appellate court dealt with the im.
pact of consecutive sentence possibilities on Rule 402(a)(2) sentencing admonitions.496 In Lundeen, the defendant entered an
unnegotiated plea of guilty to the offense of burglary.497 In accepting the plea, the trial court advised him of the minimum and
maximum penalties. 498 At sentencing, however, the trial court discovered that the defendant previously was sentenced to four to
twelve years imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter and was
in a work release program at the time of the commission of the
burglary. 499 The trial court then imposed a sentence of four to
twelve years imprisonment on the defendant to run consecutive to
the prior sentence. 5°° The defendant, on appeal, argued that the
trial court's failure to admonish him concerning the possibility of
488. Id. at 355-56, 420 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
489. Id. at 356, 420 N.E.2d at 1168.
490. Id. at 359, 420 N.E.2d at 1171.
491. Id. at 356, 420 N.E.2d at 1168.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 357, 420 N.E.2d at 1168-69.
494. Id. at 356-57, 420 N.E.2d at 1168-69. Accord People v. Kraus, 122 Il1.App. 3d
882, 461 N.E.2d 1036 (2d Dist. 1984) (defendant's mistaken belief when he entered guilty
plea that he would receive the death penalty and, thereby, avoid lengthy incarceration
when in fact the death penalty was unavailable, did not invalidate the plea or sentence);
People v. Turner, 111111. App. 3d 358, 443 N.E.2d 1167 (2d Dist. 1982) (guilty plea and
sentence of imprisonment for attempted murder not revocable, where defendant admonished thoroughly, merely because defendant subjectively believed that he would receive a
certain sentence but did not, especially where there is no reasonable justification for defendant's mistaken impression).
495. 55 111. App. 3d 799, 371 N.E.2d 329 (2d Dist. 1977).
496. Id. at 800, 371 N.E.2d at 329.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 800, 371 N.E.2d at 329-30.
499. Id. at 800-01, 371 N.E.2d at 330.
500. Id. at 800, 371 N.E.2d at 329.
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consecutive sentences rendered the plea invalid. 501
The appellate court agreed with the defendant." 2 The court
stated that it is imperative that all possible penalties be known to
the defendant on the record at the time of the plea. 0 3 The court
noted that although the defendant was made aware of the possible
imposition of consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing, he
°4
had not been made aware of it prior to entering the guilty plea.
Based upon the foregoing, the court vacated the plea and allowed
the defendant to plead anew. ° s
The Illinois Criminal Code provides that "every sentence [of imprisonment] shall include" a term of mandatory supervised release
beyond the imprisonment except when a term of natural life is imposed. 5° Illinois courts have interpreted this section to mean that
the mandatory supervised release term is, indeed, mandatory and
its imposition cannot be changed by the defendant, the state, or the
court.5 07
People v. Wills addressed whether a defendant must be informed
by the trial court of the mandatory supervised release term that
attaches to the offense prior to entering a guilty plea.508 In Wills,
the defendant pleaded guilty to three offenses.5 The trial court
imposed concurrent sentences but admonished the defendant only
regarding the mandatory supervised release term for the greatest
sentence.510 On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial
court erred in failing to admonish the defendant of the mandatory
supervised release terms for the other two offenses.5 1' The Illinois
501.

Id.

502. Id. at 800-01, 371 N.E.2d at 330-31.
503. Id. at 802, 371 N.E.2d at 331.
504. Id.
505. Id. Accord People v. Brownell, 86 Ill. App. 3d 697, 408 N.E.2d 304 (2d Dist.
1980). Compare People v. Hoyer, 100 Ill. App. 3d 418, 426 N.E.2d 1139 (2d Dist. 1981)
(defendant not entitled to withdraw guilty plea where court failed to admonish defendant
about extended term inasmuch as extended term was not actually imposed and such failure precluded the imposition of an extended term); People v. Reed, 3 Ill. App. 3d 293,
278 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dist. 1971) (defendant need not be informed at time guilty plea is
entered that consecutive sentences might be imposed if trial court otherwise complied
substantially with Rule 402).
506. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(d) (1985).
507. See People v. Reese, 66 I1. App. 3d 199, 383 N.E.2d 759 (5th Dist. 1978). See
also People v. Miller, 36 Ill. App. 3d 943, 344 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1976) (the term of
mandatory supervised release is not a matter of negotiation during plea negotiations).
508. 61 Ill. 2d 105, 330 N.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975).
509. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d at 107, 330 N.E.2d at 506 (burglary, escape, and armed
robbery).
510. Id. at 107-08, 330 N.E.2d at 507.
511. Id. at 108, 330 N.E.2d at 507.
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Supreme Court, however, ruled that the trial court's failure to admonish the defendant of the mandatory supervised release term for
the two remaining offenses was not reversible error because the
court informed the defendant of the mandatory supervised release
term on the greatest sentence, and because the sentences ordered
were to be served concurrently. 1 2 The court therefore concluded
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's admonition omissions relating to the other charges because eligibility for
both parole and discharge were governed by the sentence imposed
on the greater charge. 513
In a supplemental opinion, the Wills court ruled that admonitions regarding mandatory supervised release terms would be re5 14
quired with respect to guilty pleas accepted after May 19, 1975.
More importantly, in 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit ruled, in United States ex rel. Baker v.
Finkbeiner,515 that the failure to inform a defendant of a
516
mandatory parole term did not comport with due process.
Pursuant to Rule 402, it is evident that the trial court must inform the defendant of the direct consequences of his plea, to wit,
the penal sanctions prescribed by law. This section next considers
whether the trial court must, in addition, admonish the defendant
about the "collateral consequences" of entering a guilty plea.
In People v. Warship,51 7 the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary.
At the time the plea was entered, the defendant was on
probation by virtue of two prior convictions. 5 9 The defendant was
not advised that his guilty plea possibly could lead to the revocation of his probation. 520 Following the plea, the defendant's probation in fact was revoked and the defendant was sentenced to
imprisonment on all of the offenses in question; the sentences ran
concurrently.5 2' The defendant appealed from the judgment on his
guilty plea to the burglary charge, and argued that Rule 402 demanded an admonition regarding the possible revocation of proba512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
was still
517.
518.

Id. at 109-10, 330 N.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 110, 330 N.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 110-11, 330 N.E.2d at 509.
551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 184. In a post-Timmreck opinion, the Seventh Circuit ruled Finkbeiner
good law. United States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980).
59 11. 2d 125, 319 N.E.2d 507 (1974).
Id. at 126, 319 N.E.2d at 508.

519. Id.
520. Id. at 127, 319 N.E.2d at 508.

521.

Id. at 126, 319 N.E.2d at 508-09.
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tion. 22 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, and
ruled that the trial court is not obligated to admonish the defendant regarding the possibility of revoked probation because probation revocation is a "collateral consequence" of entering a guilty
plea,523 and admonitions regarding collateral consequences are not
required. 24
People v. Isringhaus 25 extended the "collateral consequences"
doctrine to the possibility of parole revocation. The defendant in
Isringhaus,charged with armed robbery, pleaded guilty to robbery
and received a sentence of two to six years imprisonment. 26 5At
27
the time, the defendant was on parole from a prior conviction.
The trial court admonished the defendant, pursuant to Rule 402, of
the penal consequences of entering a guilty plea; 528 it failed, however, to inform the defendant that his robbery conviction, which
arose pursuant to his guilty plea,
could cause a revocation of his
5 29
conviction.
prior
the
on
parole
On appeal, the defendant argued that parole revocation was not
a collateral consequence of the guilty plea but rather a direct penal
consequence of the guilty plea. Thus, the defendant contended
that he should have been informed of this possibility.5 30 The appellate court, following the reasoning of Warship, rejected this argument.5 3' The appellate court defined "direct consequences" as
those sanctions which the trial court has sentencing authority to
impose upon a defendant as an immediate consequence of his plea
of guilty. 32 The court held that parole revocation was not a direct
penal consequence of his plea but rather a "collateral consequence" and, therefore, admonitions regarding such a potential
consequence were not required under Rule 402.
In contrast, in People v. Correa,534 the defendant pleaded guilty
to three charges of delivery of a controlled substance. 35 He was
sentenced to three years imprisonment on each charge, with the
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 127, 319 N.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 128, 319 N.E.2d at 509.
Id.
38 I1. App. 3d 535, 347 N.E.2d 834 (5th Dist. 1976).
Id. at 535, 347 N.E.2d at 835.
Id.
Id. at 536, 347 N.E.2d at 835.
Id.

530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

Id.
Id. at 536-37, 347 N.E.2d at 835-36.
Id. at 537, 347 N.E.2d at 836.
Id. at 537, 347 N.E.2d at 835-36.
108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985).
Id. at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 307.
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sentences to run concurrently.5 36 Following his release from
prison, and during his mandatory supervised release terms, the defendant was taken into custody by the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Services for deportation purposes. 3 7 It was at
this time that the defendant first learned that his prior convictions
arising from his guilty pleas were grounds for deportation. 538 The
defendant filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act alleging involuntariness of the guilty pleas and ineffective
assistance of counsel because he was not correctly informed about
the deportation possibility. 39 At an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court vacated the convictions and sentences, set aside the guilty
pleas, reinstated all charges against the defendant, and set them for
trial.54° The State appealed, arguing that the defendant had not
been entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because the defendant was no longer imprisoned.5 41 Therefore, the
State argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the
defendant's claims.5 42 The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's
543
actions in vacating the pleas.
The Illinois Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's
ruling that the defendant was still in the State's "custody" when
his petition was filed because he was serving a mandatory supervised release term. 5" The court, therefore, concluded that the trial
court possessed jurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act to entertain his claims of error. 545 In reaching the merits of
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court responded that although deportation is a "collateral consequence" of
a guilty plea, it is nonetheless a "drastic consequence. '546 The

court noted that for most defendants, deportation is a more severe
penalty than those a trial court could impose after accepting a
guilty plea.5 47 Accordingly, the court ruled that although the trial
536. Id. at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 307-08.
537.
538.
539.

Id. at 544, 485 N.E.2d at 308.
Id.
Id. Defense counsel advised defendant deportation was not possible.

540.

Id.

541. Id.
542. Id. at 545, 485 N.E.2d at 308.
543. Id. at 553, 485 N.E.2d at 312. The appellate court assumed the trial court had
jurisdiction if the defendant was on parole at the time he filed his claim. See People v.
Correa, 124 Il1.App. 3d 668, 465 N.E.2d 507 (1st Dist. 1984), aff'd, 108 Ill.
2d 541, 485
N.E.2d 307 (1985).
544. Correa, 108 Il1.2d at 546, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
545. Id. at 546-47, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
546. Id. at 550, 485 N.E.2d at 311.
547. Id. at 550-51, 485 N.E.2d at 311.
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court had no obligation to admonish the defendant about the collateral consequence in question, 548 the defense counsel's failure to
correctly inform the defendant of this important collateral consequence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.5 49 The court
therefore deemed the guilty plea unintelligent and involuntary. 550
Warship, Isringhaus, and Correa illustrate the point that a trial
court itself need not invariably inform the defendant of the collateral consequences of entering a plea because direct penal consequence admonishments are all that are required. 55 ' As previously
stated, Illinois case law defines direct consequences as those sanctions which a trial court has the power to impose upon the defendant as an immediate consequence of his guilty plea.5 52 As a
practical matter, however, Correa represents a weakening of the
theory that a trial judge is not obligated to inform defendants of
collateral consequences. Specifically, Correa dealt with a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.5 53 By ruling that a plea is involuntary when defense counsel fails to correctly inform the defendant of
the collateral consequences of his guilty plea,5 54 however, the Illinois Supreme Court, in effect, is calling for a more fully informed
defendant. Because a trial court judge cannot assume, as proved
true in Correa, that the defendant was properly advised of drastic
collateral consequences by his attorney, it seems the trial judge is
best advised, for reasons of judicial economy, to admonish the defendant about such consequences to assurefinality with respect to
entry of the plea even though technically the judge is not so
required. 555
548. Id. at 550, 485 N.E.2d at 310.
549. Id. at 551-53, 485 N.E.2d at 311-12. The attorney had actually advised the
defendant that deportation was not a realistic possibility. This constituted ineffective
counsel, although the court did not specify if its conclusion was based on sixth amendment grounds.
550. Id. at 553, 485 N.E.2d at 312.
551. See supra notes 517-48 and accompanying text.
552. People v. Isringhaus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 535, 537, 347 N.E.2d 834, 836 (5th Dist.
1976).
553. Correa, 108 Il. 2d at 551-53, 485 N.E.2d at 310-12.
554. Id.
555. Whether the trial court must be assured that the defendant understands the im-

plications of other collateral consequences of a felony conviction in Illinois is not clear. It
is noteworthy that in Correa, the court in its discussion of collateral consequences referred to an article which deals with a multitude of possibilities in this regard. 108 Ill. 2d
at 548, 485 N.E.2d at 310 (citing Decker, Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction

in Illinois, 56 CHi-KENT L.

REV.

731 (1980)).
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F. Rule 402 Admonitions Regarding ConstitutionalRights
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 402(a)(3) and (a)(4) are designed
556
to effectuate a valid waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights.
They provide that the trial judge shall inform the accused that he
has (1) a right to plead not guilty and persist in that plea,"5 7 (2) a
right to a jury trial,55 8 and (3) a right to confront his accusers. 5 9
The Committee Comments which explain the purposes of these
rules state that Rules 402(a)(3) and (a)(4) were designed to remedy
the Boykin concern regarding "three important federal rights,"
namely, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
the sixth amendment right to trial by jury, and the sixth amendment right to confrontation s6 Thus, without proper admonishments designed to secure a voluntary and intelligent plea, waiver of
such significant constitutional rights will not be presumed 6 As
noted above, however, Illinois courts do not require literal compliance with Rule 402; Illinois courts merely require "substantial
compliance" with Rule 402, a standard
which generally permits
5 62
less than thorough admonishments.
When the trial court completely abrogates its duty to properly
admonish the defendant about his constitutional rights, the appellate court will not find substantial compliance with Rule 402.563
For example, in People v. Sutherland,5 " the trial judge's failure to
admonish pursuant to Rule 402(a)(3) and (a)(4) did not5 6constitute
5
substantial compliance and resulted in reversible error.
Similarly, if the trial judge fails to admonish the accused about
most, but not all, of his constitutional rights, the reviewing court is
unlikely to find substantial compliance. 566 For example, in People
556.

ILL. S. Cr. R. 402(a)(3) & (a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, paras. 402 (a)(3) &

(a)(4).
ILL. S. CT. R. 402(a)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(a)(3).
ILL. S. Cr. R. 402(a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 402(a)(4).
559. Id.
560. ILL. S. Cr. R. 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 402 (Smith-Hurd 1985)
Committee Comments, at 394-95. See supra notes 157-86 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Boykin.
561. See supra note 163.
562. See supra notes 326-411 and accompanying text.
563. See, e.g., Sutherland, 128 Ill. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210 (4th Dist. 1984).
557.
558.

564. Id.
565. See supra notes 358-69 and 408-11 and accompanying text.
566. See, e.g., People v. Waldorf, 94 Ill. App. 3d 976, 419 N.E.2d 428 (1st Dist. 1981)
(no substantial compliance where defendant not advised of his rights to plead not guilty
and confront his accusers).
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v. Thompson, 67 the trial court's failure to advise the defendant
about his right to plead not guilty, in accordance with Rule
402(a)(3), and his right to confront his
accusers, pursuant to Rule
5 68
402(a)(4), was grounds for a reversal.
On the other hand, exact compliance with Rule 402 admonitions
regarding constitutional rights is not required. 569 For example, in
People v. Cohn, 7° the trial judge referred to the defendant's right to
a "trial" without reference to a "jury."571 Other aspects of the
judge's admonishments were complete. 72 The appellate court
ruled that although the trial court's reference to a "trial" rather
than "trial by jury" might mislead a defendant in certain circumstances into believing no right to a jury exists,5 73 the trial court
record did not indicate that the defendant actually was prejudiced
by the omission. 74 In Thompson, the court indicated that it was
evident that the defendant understood the existence of her right to
a jury trial because she later remarked during sentencing that she
had not exercised her right to a jury in order to avoid publicity.5 5
In addition, the defendant had advanced degrees, including a doctorate in philosophy, and was an experienced professional counselor-psychologist, which
belied the notion that she did not
576
understand her rights.
G. Rule 402 Inquiry Regarding Voluntariness of the Plea
As has been stressed at various points in this Article, in Boykin
v. Alabama 77 the United States Supreme Court ruled that all
guilty pleas must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Further,
the Court insisted that due process requires that the record in a
guilty plea proceeding affirmatively set forth whether the trial
578
court determined the voluntary nature of the plea.
567. People v. Thompson, 10 Ill.
App. 3d 455, 294 N.E.2d 104 (5th Dist. 1973) (per
curiam).
568. Id. at 456, 294 N.E.2d at 104-05. In addition, the trial court did not establish
that the defendant's plea was voluntary.
569. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 22 111. App. 3d 1075, 318 N.E.2d 86 (1st Dist.
1974) (substantial compliance found even though defendant not advised of his right to
plead not guilty and persist in that plea).
570. 91 Ill.
App. 3d 209, 414 N.E.2d 543 (2d Dist. 1980).
571. Id. at 210-11, 414 N.E.2d at 544-45.
572. Id.
573. Id. at 212, 414 N.E.2d at 546.
574. Id. at 212-13, 414 N.E.2d at 546-47.
575. Id. at 213, 414 N.E.2d at 546.
576. Id. at 213, 414 N.E.2d at 546-47.
577. 395 U.S. 238.
578. Id. at 243-44.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

In order to comply with the mandates of Boykin, Rule 402(b)
provides that the trial judge cannot accept a guilty plea without
first determining that the plea is voluntary. 79 The Committee
Comments explain that this rule is designed to prompt the trial
judge to ascertain whether the plea of guilty is a product of force,
580
threats, or promises.
Notwithstanding the rather clear cut responsibility that Boykin
and Rule 402(b) impose upon the trial court to inqiuire affirmatively into the voluntariness of guilty pleas, one would be remiss to
not examine, in the context of Rule 402, the very troublesome
opinion of People v. Stewart.181 In Stewart, the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that even though the trial court failed to make any
inquiry of the defendant regarding the voluntariness of the plea,
there was no error because there was "no evidence in the record
that he [the defendant] was pressured or forced to enter a guilty
plea."51 8 2 According to Justice Simon's dissent, the net effect of
Stewart is to relieve Illinois trial judges of the important responsibilities of making an inquiry on the record into the voluntariness of
the plea which allows a reviewing court to determine if the plea
was coerced.58 3
In a separate dissent, Justice Moran condemned the majority
ruling and insisted that due process and Rule 402 require "an affirmative showing, in the trial court record," that the plea was voluntary.58 4 Citing Boykin, the dissent noted that the trial court and,
in effect, the majority "completely abrogated its duty to the defendant to determine if his plea was voluntary. 5 -8 5 Justice Moran's
dissent also concluded that the Stewart majority ruling implies that
the burden falls on the defendant to prove the guilty plea is involuntary when, in fact, Boykin and Rule 402 clearly assign the bur586
den of establishing voluntariness to the trial court.
579.
580.

ILL. S. CT. R. 402(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(b).
ILL. S. Cr. R. 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402, Committee Com-

ments, at 395.
581. 101111. 2d 470, 463 N.E.2d 677. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text
for prior discussion of this aspect of Stewart.
582. Stewart, 101 Ill.
2d at 487, 463 N.E.2d at 685.
583. Justice Simon, dissenting in Stewart, remarked as follows about this problem: "I
am unable to determine from the record whether the plea was entered voluntarily....
[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that any determination was made that no
force, threats or promises had been made to obtain the guilty plea." Id. at 502, 463
N.E.2d at 693 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
584. Id. at 496, 463 N.E.2d at 690 (Moran, J.,
dissenting).
585. Id. at 497, 463 N.E.2d at 690 (Moran, J.,
dissenting).
586. Id. at 497-98, 463 N.E.2d at 691 (Moran, J.,
dissenting).
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Ten years earlier, in People v. Ellis,5 87 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the trial court's failure to ask the accused in accordance
with Rule 402(b) whether the guilty plea was induced by force,
threats, or unlawful promises did not constitute reversible error.5 88
In any event, neither the Stewart nor Ellis decision precisely clarifies what the defendant must do in order to warrant the trial
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea. One Illinois
Supreme Court decision, People v. Dudley,5 9 implies that the defendant must at least make a claim of involuntariness on the record
at the time the plea is accepted in order to justify inquiry by the
trial court of the voluntariness of the plea. 9° Absent such a claim,
the failure of the trial court to inquire into the voluntariness of the
guilty plea will at most be deemed harmless esor 91
H. The Rule 402 FactualBasis Requirement
Although it is doubtful that it is invariably required as a matter
of federal constitutional law, Rule 402(c) states that the trial court
shall not enter final judgment on a guilty plea without establishing
that a "factual basis" supports the plea. 59 2 The trial judge has relatively broad latitude in terms of how he satisfies this requirement.593 Case law has defined a "factual basis" as information
from which the trial judge could reasonably conclude that the defendant actually committed the offense to which he is pleading
5 94
guilty.
An example of an adequate factual basis supporting a plea can
be found in People v. Hudson.195 In Hudson, the defendant pleaded
5 96
guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to imprisonment.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court did not prop587. 59 I1. 2d 255, 320 N.E.2d 15 (1974).
588. Id. at 257, 320 N.E.2d at 16.
589. 58 11. 2d 57, 316 N.E.2d 773 (1974). See also People v. Scott, 9 Ill. App. 3d 626,
292 N.E.2d 583 (3d Dist. 1973) (trial court's failure to inquire whether any force or
threats or unlawful promises prompted entry of plea is not reversible error absent prejudice established by the accused).
590. Dudley, 588 Ill. 2d at 60-61, 316 N.E.2d at 774-75.
591. Id.
592. ILL. S. CT. R. 402(c), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402(c).
593. The Committee Comments state that "no particular kind of inquiry is specified;
the court may satisfy itself by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government, by examination of the presentence report, or by any means which seem best for the
kind of case involved." ILL. S. CT. R. 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 402 Committee Comments, at 395.
594. People v. Barker, 83 I11. 2d 319, 327-28, 415 N.E.2d 404, 408 (1980).
595. 7 11. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (5th Dist. 1972).
596. Id. at 802, 288 N.E.2d at 534.
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erly establish a factual basis as required by Rule 402(c). 597 The
appellate court concluded that a dialogue in court between the defendant and the trial judge, wherein the defendant expressly admitted his involvement in the armed robbery,5 98 satisfactorily
complied with Rule 402.599 In addition, the appellate court in
Hudson noted three other acceptable ways to demonstrate a factual
basis for a guilty plea: (1) the prosecutor may be permitted to summarize the testimony that he would have presented; (2) the witnesses themselves may testify to the facts indicating the defendant's
guilt; and (3) the pre-sentence report may provide a factual
basis. e °
The quantum of proof necessary to establish a factual basis is
less than that necessary to sustain a conviction.60l It is only necessary that the record reflect a basis from which the judge reasonably
could conclude that the accused committed the acts and had the
requisite mental state, if any, required of the crime.6° 2 On the
other hand, if a defendant enters a guilty plea while simultaneously
protesting his innocence, the record behind the factual basis must
be in accordance with one "from which a jury could find the de597. Id.
598.
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT'S
ATTORNEY:

And do you understand that the offense is of armed robbery of a
motel ...
Yes, I understand it was a motel where an armed robbery was
committed.
And do you understand that by pleading guilty you are admitting
some participation in the armed robbery?
I don't know.
I think you should discuss this further with your attorney out of
the presence of the court.
In regard... to that last question, would you answer that
question?

Yes.
Do you fully understand what your counsel has explained to you?
Yes, I do, your honor.
And you have answered all of them in the affirmative and you
have further stated that you were a participant to a certain felony
committed in this country?
Yes.
DEFENDANT:
Id. at 804, 288 N.E.2d at 536.
599. Id.
600. Id. at 803-04, 288 N.E.2d at 536.
601. People v. Nyberg, 64 111. 2d 210, 215, 356 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 970 (1977) (quoting People v. Arnold, 18 Ill. App. 3d 95, 98, 309 N.E.2d 406, 408
(1st Dist. 1974)).
602. People v. Barker, 83 IM.2d 319, 327-28, 415 N.E.2d 404, 408 (1980).
DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
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fendant guilty of the offense... ."I' Thus, it appears that a higher
quantum of proof may be involved in circumstances such as the
latter.
Although a factual basis apparently is not constitutionally required, 6 4 lack of a factual basis may give rise to reversible error on
appeal.605 However, if this same issue is raised in a collateral PostConviction Hearing Act petition, it is doubtful that relief will be
granted because such an omission does not rise to the level of constitutional irregularity. 6°6
I. Rule 604 and 605 Admonishments Regarding Motion to
Vacate and Right to Appeal
The final section of this Article examines the criminal defendant's appellate rights following judgment entered upon a guilty
plea. This section discusses four specific issues which arise under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604 and 605: (1) admonishments regarding the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea and vacate the judgment; (2) establishing a basis for the defendant's
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment; (3)
admonishments regarding the defendant's right to appeal; and (4)
the timeliness of a notice of appeal.
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 604 and 605 dictate the procedures
imposed upon the trial court in order to protect the criminal defendant's right to appeal. Rule 604 provides that a defendant cannot appeal a judgment of conviction based on his guilty plea unless
he files a motion to vacate his plea within thirty days of the trial
court's sentence on the conviction.Y67 Rule 605 states that a defendant entering a guilty plea must be advised by the trial judge at
sentencing that (1) he has a right to appeal, (2) a condition of his
appeal is filing a motion to vacate his plea within thirty days of
sentencing, and (3) if his motion to vacate is granted, a new trial
date will be set on the charges which were the subject of his successful motion to vacate. 601 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court, pur603. Id. at 333, 415 N.E.2d at 410.
604. See, e.g., People v. Nardi, 48 Ill. 2d 111, 268 N.E.2d 389 (1971).

605. See, e.g., People v. Rollins, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 293 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1973);
People v. Pruitt, 7 Ill. App. 3d 808, 288 N.E.2d 549 (5th Dist. 1972).
606. See supra note 41.

607. Rule 604 states in pertinent part that "no appeal from a judgment entered upon
a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which

sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and
vacate the judgment.. .
(1985).

."

ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 604(d)

608. Rule 605 states in pertinent part:

920
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suant to Rules 604 and 605, has enacted a procedural scheme
whereby the criminal defendant's right to appeal a judgment entered upon a guilty plea is preconditioned upon that criminal defendant's filing a timely motion with the trial court to withdraw
the guilty plea and vacate the judgment. 6° The appeal will be considered only after the trial court's rejection of the defendant's
timely motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment.6 10
1. Admonishment Regarding Motion to Withdraw the Guilty
Plea: Consequences of Failure to Admonish Pursuant
to Rule 605(b)
Rule 604(d) explicitly preconditions a criminal defendant's right
to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea upon his
filing with the trial court, within thirty days of the date on which
sentence is imposed, a motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the
judgment. 6 1" Rule 605(b) orders the trial court to admonish the
defendant of this precondition to the right to appeal.61 2
People v. Ryant 61 3 addressed whether the criminal defendant is
excused from complying with this precondition in light of the fact
that the trial court failed to properly admonish the defendant pursuant to 605(b). The defendant in Ryant pleaded guilty to several

crimes and was sentenced to various terms of incarceration.6 4 The
defendant was not advised, consistent with Rule 605(b), that he
was required to first move to withdraw his plea and vacate the
judgment within thirty days of sentencing in order to appeal.615
Thereafter, the defendant sought an appeal on other grounds with[I]n all cases in which a judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, at the time of
imposing sentence, the trial court shall advise the defendant substantially as
follows:
(1) That he has a right to appeal;
(2) That prior to taking an appeal he must file in the trial court, within 30
days of the date on which sentence is imposed, a written motion asking to have
the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, setting forth
the grounds for the motion;
(3) That if the motion is allowed, the plea of guilty, sentence and judgement
will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which the plea of
guilty was made ....
ILL. S. CT. R. 605(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1A, para. 605(b) (1985).
609. ILL. S. Cr. R. 604(d) & 605(bX2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, paras. 604(d) &
605(bX2).
610. Id.
611. ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 604(d).
612. ILL. S. CT. R. 605(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 605(b).

613. 41 111. App. 3d 273, 354 N.E.2d 395 (5th Dist. 1976).
614. Id. at 274, 354 N.E.2d at 396.
615. Id.
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out first moving to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment.616
The appellate court held that, because the court failed to properly admonish the defendant consistent with Rule 605(b), the defendant had no way of knowing of the requirement regarding the
motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment. t7 Thus, the
failure to admonish excused the defendant from making his motion
to vacate in a timely fashion in order to perfect his appeal of certain pre-plea irregularities. 618 Accordingly, the court reviewed the
grounds raised on appeal and determined that they required withdrawal of the plea.61 9
Similarly, in People v. Saldana,62 ° the trial court failed to admonish the defendant of the necessity to move to withdraw the guilty
plea and vacate the judgment within thirty days of the date of sentencing as a precondition to any appeal. 62 The defendant did not
so move. 622 The appellate court held that the defendant had not
relinquished his right to appeal because the trial judge omitted the
necessary admonishment. Accordingly, the court remanded the
case to allow the defendant to file a motion that his guilty plea be
withdrawn.623 The court added, however, that in the interest of
judicial economy, a defendant, who has not been admonished
properly about the motion to vacate his plea, could combine
grounds supporting a motion to vacate with other grounds for appeal.624 This would allow the reviewing court to determine
whether the motion to vacate is warranted, thereby avoiding a remand to the trial court.62 5 Thereafter, if the appellate court determined the motion to vacate should be granted, it could reach the
merits of the defendant's appeal claims.626
The forementioned decisions allude to the significant remedies
available to the reviewing court when a trial court fails to properly
admonish the defendant pursuant to Rule 605(b). Noncompliance
with Rule 605(b) provides the appellate court with three alterna616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 275-276, 354 N.E.2d at 397 (grounds included failure to admonish defendant about his right to counsel pursuant to Rule 401).
620. 53 I1. App. 3d 636, 368 N.E.2d 1055 (2d Dist. 1977).
621. Id. at 636-37, 368 N.E.2d at 1056.
622. Id. at 637, 368 N.E.2d at 1056.
623. Id. at 636-38, 368 N.E.2d at 1056-57.
624. Id. at 638, 368 N.E.2d at 1057.
625. Id. Because the defendant had not set out any grounds supportive of his motion
to vacate in his appeal, a remand was necessary.
626. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

tive remedies. First, the appellate court may remand the case to
the trial court with orders to allow the defendant the opportunity
to file a motion to withdraw the plea, which motion will be considered by the trial court.627 Second, it may excuse the defendant's
failure to move to vacate the plea and consider the merits of the
appeal without a remand requiring trial court consideration of the
motion to vacate. 628 Third, it could consider the merits of the motion to vacate included in the appeal, vacate the plea if the plea is
invalid and, thereafter, review the merits of the appeal.629
2. Consequences of Proper Admonishment and a Timely
Motion to Withdraw the Plea
Generally, when the trial court properly advises the defendant
that filing a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate
the judgement is a condition precedent to the right to appeal the
judgment, no right to appeal will be recognized if the defendant
fails to comply with this requirement.630 Illustrative of this point is
People v. Newbold,63 ' wherein the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and theft.632 The defendant in Newbold filed his notice of
appeal pro se but failed to precede this motion with a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d). 633 The record
revealed that the trial court clearly admonished the defendant of
his procedural obligations.634
The appellate court dismissed the appeal. 635 The court enumer627. See supra notes 623-26 and accompanying text. See also People v. Dorsey, 129
Ill. App. 3d 52, 471 N.E.2d 1053 (4th Dist. 1984) (appellate court remanded the case

back to trial court with orders to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea).

628. See supra notes 613-19 and accompanying text. People v. Jackson, 122 Ill. App.

3d 166, 460 N.E.2d 904 (2d Dist. 1984) (excessive sentence claim considered and rejected). See also People v. Martin, 58 Ill. App. 3d 915, 374 N.E.2d 1156 (3d Dist. 1978)
(excessive sentence claim considered and rejected); People v. Lundeen, 55 Ill. App. 3d
799, 371 N.E.2d 329 (2d Dist. 1977) (plea not in compliance with Rule 402 was deemed
invalid and remanded to trial court for new plea); People v. Theobold, 43 111. App. 3d
897, 356 N.E.2d 1258 (3d Dist. 1976) (defendant's claim that the gun charge was not
valid because the gun was disassembled, that he suffered from ineffective assistance of

counsel, and that an inappropriate sentence was imposed was considered and rejected by
the appellate court.).
629. See supra notes 624-26 and accompanying text. Cf. People v. Thompson, 47 Ill.
App. 3d 346, 361 N.E.2d 1169 (2d Dist. 1977).
630. People v. Frey, 67 Ill. 2d 77, 85-86, 364 N.E.2d 46, 48-49 (1977).
631. 98 Il. App. 3d 1018, 425 N.E.2d 9 (5th Dist. 1981).
632. Id. at 1019, 425 N.E.2d at 10.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 1019-20, 425 N.E.2d at 10.
635. Id. at 1021, 425 N.E.2d at 11.
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ated the following two exceptions to the requirement that a defendant precede his appeal with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea:
(1) when the trial court failed to admonish properly the defendant
pursuant to Rule 605(b), and (2) when the failure to file such a
motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.63 In Newbold,
the defendant was admonished properly. Furthermore, he could
not claim ineffective counsel because he had proceeded pro se. 6 "
Due to the defendant's failure to perfect his appellate rights, the
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the appeal. 63 8
Similarly, in People v. Green,639 the appellate court ruled that a
thirty day lapse from imposition of sentence without the filing of a
motion to withdraw the plea deprives the trial court of jurisdiction
to entertain a defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw the plea
and vacate the judgment. 64° The court in Green cited the exceptions enunciated in Newbold"I and added a third; this third exception applied when a bona fide doubt existed regarding the
defendant's fitness to plead in the first instance. 64 2 After due consideration of the defendant's claim in this regard, the appellate
court determined that the trial court did not err because the trial
record revealed that the defendant was fit to enter his plea." 3
In conclusion, Rule 605(b)(2) requires a defendant to file a
timely motion to vacate prior to appeal. 6" When the defendant
fails to comply with this rule or files a late motion to vacate,
neither the trial court nor the appellate court has jurisdiction to
entertain the defendant's claims.645
636. Id. at 1019, 425 N.E.2d at 10.
637. Id. at 1019-21, 425 N.E.2d at 10-11. Compare People v. Scott, 143 11. App. 3d
540, 493 N.E.2d 27 (1st Dist. 1986) (failure of appointed appellate counsel to file timely
notice of appeal precluding defendant's appeal as of right amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and required that
filing of late notice of appeal is permitted); People v. Pulley, 75 Ill. App. 3d 193, 394
N.E.2d 47 (5th Dist. 1979) (counsel's failure to file written motion to vacate plea was
ineffective counsel which excused defendant's failure to file such motion and required
defendant to file late motion to withdraw plea). But see People v. Creek, 112 Ill. App. 3d
1081, 446 N.E.2d 555 (4th Dist. 1983) (failure of trial court to notify public defender that
defendant wished to file a timely motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment
was harmless error and defendant was not deprived of his effective assistance of counsel).
638. Newbold, 98 I1. App. 3d at 1020-21, 425 N.E.2d at 11.
639. 116 Ill. App. 3d 815, 452 N.E.2d 767 (1st Dist. 1983).
640. Id. at 817, 452 N.E.2d at 769.
641. Id. at 817-18, 452 N.E.2d at 769.
642. Id. at 818-19, 452 N.E.2d at 769-70G.
643. Id. at 819-20, 452 N.E.2d at 770. The court also determined he had no valid
claim of ineffective counsel. Id. at 820, 452 N.E.2d at 770-71.
644. ILL. S. CT. R. 605(b)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I OA, para. 605(b)(2).
645. People v. Stojetz, 46 Il1.App. 3d 205, 360 N.E.2d 1139 (5th Dist. 1977) (motion
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Failure to Admonish in Juvenile Proceedings

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660 provides that appeals from final
judgment in delinquent minor matters are governed by the appeal
rules applicable to adult criminal cases. 6 " Consequently, juvenile
delinquency proceedings are subject to Illinois Supreme Court
Rules 604 and 605. In re Walker6 7 addressed the issue of whether
a juvenile defendant is excused from complying with Rules 604 and
605 when the trial court fails to admonish properly the defendant.
In Walker, a juvenile entered an admission to a murder charge in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding and was committed to the Department of Corrections. 648 Although he was admonished about his
right to appeal, the court failed to admonish him regarding his obligation to withdraw his admission within thirty days of the imposition of sentence as a precondition to appeal. 649 The appellate
court permitted the defendant to file a motion to withdraw the
admission. 65 ° The court posited that when the record is silent regarding the condition precedent, courts should not speculate regarding admonishments which might have been given by private
counsel.65 '

4. Establishing Basis for Motion to Withdraw the Plea
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides that the motion to
withdraw must state in writing the grounds supporting the withdrawal.63 2 If the facts supportive of the motion do not appear in
the trial court record, Rule 604(d) requires that they appear in a
supporting affidavit.653 The "grounds" or "facts" contemplated by
Rule 604(d) relate to the voluntariness 65 4 and intelligence 6 5 of the
guilty plea. The substance of the motion to withdraw the plea and
to vacate filed two months too late). See also People v. Stacey, 68 Ill.
2d 261, 369 N.E.2d
1254 (1977) (defendant, sentenced after a guilty plea, who desires to appeal sentence only

pursuant to Rule 604(d), must file motion to withdraw plea and vacate judgment in order
to preserve appeal).

646. Rule 660(a) provides that "[a]ppeals from final judgments in delinquent minor
proceedings, except as otherwise specifically provided, shall be governed by the rules ap-

plicable to criminal cases." ILL. S. CT. R. 660(a), ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 110A, para.

660(a) (1985)
647. 102 III. App. 3d 791, 430 N.E.2d 367 (Ist Dist. 1981).
648. Id, at 792, 430 N.E.2d at 367.
649. Id. at 794, 430 N.E.2d at 369.
650. Id. at 794-96, 430 N.E.2d at 369-70.
651. Id. at 795, 430 N.E.2d at 370.
652. ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 604(d).
653. Id.
654. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (guilty plea will be set aside
only if not voluntary and intelligent).
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vacate the judgment must allege either that the plea was not voluntary, because of pre-plea influences, or was not intelligent, because of incomplete admonishments 6 7 or incompetent counsel. 6 8
A basic rule that must be kept in mind is that a voluntary and
65 9
intelligent plea waives all pre-plea non-jurisdictional questions;
only those claims that undermine the trial court's jurisdiction survive."6 For example, when a defendant contended his guilty plea
was tainted by an earlier coerced confession and his counsel's misjudgment of the admissibility of the confession, the plea nevertheless was deemed voluntarily and intelligent."' Similarly, when a
defendant pleaded guilty after an unsuccessful motion to suppress
evidence because his attorney erroneously instructed him that he
could appeal the outcome of the suppression hearing after entering
the plea of guilty, the defendant's plea was upheld as voluntary and
intelligent." 2 In both of these cases, the plea of guilty constituted a
waiver of the claim that the state had illegally procured evidence
that was incriminating. 663 In neither of these cases was the defense
counsel's erroneous advise deemed incompetent counsel. 6 " These
cases illustrate that a defendant cannot successfully vacate a plea
by pointing to pre-plea irregularities which do not relate to lack of
voluntariness and intelligence surrounding the plea itself.66 If the
defendant does not support his motion to vacate his plea with facts
that undermine the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea, the
plea will be upheld. 666
655. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty plea defective where defendant not properly admonished about the plea consequences).
656. See People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. 2d 565, 568, 241 N.E.2d 313, 314 (1968) (stating that
"[The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any
defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not
guilty").
657. See, e.g., Sutherland, 128 Ill. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210 (4th Dist. 1984).
658. See, e.g. Correa, 124 Il1. App. 3d 668, 465 N.E.2d 507 (1st Dist. 1984).
659. People v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 2d 400, 288 N.E.2d 463 (1972) (venue); People v. Bivens,
43 Il1. App. 3d 79, 356 N.E.2d 665 (5th Dist. 1976) (speedy trial).
660. See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (double jeopardy claim survives plea of guilty); People v. Walker, 83 I1. 2d 306, 415 N.E.2d 1021 (1980) (claim of
defective charging instrument is jurisdictional and survives guilty plea but, here, was
harmless error).
661. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text for more complete discussion of this opinion.
662. People v. Green, 21 111. App. 3d 1072, 316 N.E.2d 530 (4th Dist. 1974).
663. See supra notes 661-62 and accompanying text.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. People v. Paul, 93 I1. App. 3d 302, 417 N.E.2d 251 (2d Dist. 1981) (when defendant entered guilty plea on erroneous advice of counsel that defendant would be imprisoned in a minimum security facility did not render plea involuntary; defendant's
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5. Admonishments Regarding Right to Appeal
Supreme Court Rule 605(b) provides that in cases where a judgment of conviction is based on a guilty plea, the trial court must
advise the defendant about his right to appeal during sentencing.66
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the pronouncement of
sentence is the judicial act which comprises the final appealable
order; entry of the judgment order is merely a ministerial act and is
only evidence of the sentence.668 Thus, the defendant's right to appeal arises at the time of sentencing.669
At the time of sentencing, the defendant sustains the burden of
perfecting his right to appeal by filing a motion with the trial court
to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment.6 7 0 The motion must
allege facts sufficient to bring into question the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea.67' If and when the trial court denies the
defendant's motion, the defendant may appeal the denial to a
higher court.67 2 Failure to file a motion to withdraw the plea, absent a mistake by the trial court judge respecting proper admonishments, renders the appellate court powerless to hear the
defendant's claims of error.673 As previously noted, the mistake
generally encountered is the trial court's failure to admonish sufficiently the'defendant of the need to file a Rule 604(d) motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.674 Just as it is error if the trial judge does
not admonish the defendant about his right to move to vacate his
failure to raise issue of incompetent counsel constituted waiver of that issue). See also
People v. Ahlstrand, 113 Il1.App. 3d 363, 447 N.E.2d 517 (2d Dist. 1983). The Ashland
court stated:
[the] defendant should have accompanied his request for remandment [to Circuit Court for the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea] with a showing of
the facts upon which he relies to secure a withdrawal of his guilty pleas. If the
claim of error is one which may be supported by the record, the reviewing court
will then be in a position to review the case . . . . The bare statement that
defendant may have claims of error based, in part, on matters outside the record
is not enough.
Id. at 365, 447 N.E.2d at 518.
667. ILL. S. CT. R. 605(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 605(b).
668. People v. Allen, 71 111. 2d 378, 381, 375 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (1978). But see
People v. Brown, 121 I11.App. 3d 776, 459 N.E.2d 1175 (2d Dist. 1984), where the
appellate court ruled conviction and sentence for one tried "in abstentia" is not final and
appealable until defendant has returned and a ruling is made on any claim that the absence was willful. Presumably, then, no admonishments regarding appeal are required in
such circumstances.
669. People v. Allen, 71 111. 2d 378, 381, 375 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (1978).
670. See supra notes 630-45 and accompanying text.
671. See supra notes 652-66 and accompanying text.
672. ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 604(d).
673. See supra notes 611-45 and accompanying text.
674. See supra notes 611-29 and accompanying text.

1988]

Guilty Plea Proceedings

927

plea, so too it is error for the judge to fail to advise the defendant
about his right to appeal.67 For example, in People v. Wilson,67 6
the defendants were convicted of certain misdemeanors and were
sentenced to jail. 7 The trial court failed to admonish the defendants of their right to appeal and the thirty day deadline for filing
appeals.67 8 Consequently, none of the defendants filed a notice of
appeal within the thirty day period. 679 The Illinois Supreme Court
6 80
reversed the appellate court's denial of the defendants' appeal.
The court stated that the trial court's failure to admonish the defendants of the thirty day limitation made it impossible to conclude
that the defendants knowingly waived their right to appeal.68'
The defendant will not prevail if he raises the trial judge's failure
to admonish him about his right to appeal in a petition for collateral relief, rather than on direct appeal.68 2 In People v. Cox, 683 the
defendant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of indecent liberties
with a child and was sentenced to imprisonment. 4 On appeal
from denial of relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
the defendant contended that he was denied due process because
the trial court failed to advise him that, under Rule 605, all defendants, once sentenced, must be advised of their right to appeal. 8 5
The Illinois Supreme Court denied the defendant relief on this
issue.68 6 The court held that petitions arising under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must reflect a constitutional claim.6 87 The
court stated that Rule 605's right to appeal admonishment is not a
constitutional right and that relief was not appropriate in a collateral post-conviction petition.68 8 Cox, therefore, suggests that the
appropriate avenue of relief with this type of claim is the direct
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.

People v. Wilson, 50 Ill. 2d 323, 278 N.E.2d 775 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 324-25, 278 N.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 325, 278 N.E.2d at 776.
Id.

680. Id. at 326, 278 N.E.2d at 777.
681. Id. at 325-26, 278 N.E.2d at 776-77.
682. People v. Cox, 53 I1. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
683. Id.
684. Id. at 102-03, 291 N.E.2d at 2.
685. Id. at 106, 291 N.E.2d at 4.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. The court stated that:
[t1he allegations of the petition that the court failed to give defendant such
advice did not raise a question of constitutional dimension. Our rule stems
from the dictates of good practice rather than constitutional command, and
where the question has arisen it has been held that the failure of a court to
advise of the right to appeal is not a denial of due process or equal protection.
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appeal. 689 Assuming the defendant was not admonished properly
about his appeal rights in timely fashion, this may also be true
when the time for appeal has lapsed. 690 As Wilson demonstrates,
the lack of a timely appeal will be attributed to the trial court's
omission.691
Both Wilson and Cox involved a trial court's failure to admonish
the defendant of his right to appeal and the consequences of such
failure when the defendant does not appeal in timely fashion or
declines to appeal. In People v. Tiess,692 the appellate court addressed the consequences of the trial court's failure to admonish
the defendant of his right to appeal when the defendant did appeal
in a timely fashion despite the trial court's omission. 693 The appellate court in Tiess stated that the failure to admonish the defendant
of his right to appeal is moot when the defendant appeals within
the requisite period.694 The court likened the defendant's objection
about not being admonished to the complaint of a bus passenger
who boards a bus and, thereafter, complains that he didn't know
what time the bus was leaving or if it was leaving at all.695
In conclusion, when the trial court fails to admonish the defendant of this right to appeal, and the defendant does not file a timely
notice of appeal, the appellate court will exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant's appeal. 696 In adult criminal cases 697 and juvenile
delinquency matters, 698 it is incumbent that the trial judge scrupuId. at 106, 291 N.E.2d at 4 (quoting People v. Covington, 45 Ill. 2d 105, 108, 257 N.E.2d
106, 108 (1970)).
689. See supra notes 683-88 and accompanying text.
690. See supra notes 675-81 and accompanying text.
691. Id.
692. 97 I1. App. 3d 45, 421 N.E.2d 1059 (2d Dist. 1981).
693. Id. at 52-53, 421 N.E.2d at 1064-65.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 52, 421 N.E.2d at 1064-65. Accord People v. Danis, 70 Ill. App. 3d 454,
388 N.E.2d 887 (1st Dist. 1979) (failure to admonish as required by Rule 605 is moot
issue where defendant in fact appeals in timely fashion); People v. Leon, 66 II. App. 3d
778, 383 N.E.2d 1378 (1st Dist. 1978).
696. See, e.g., People v. Gramlich, 69 I1. App. 3d 23, 386 N.E.2d 1171 (5th Dist.
1979) (appellate court considered the issues by defendant on appeal because the trial
court failed to admonish the defendant of his 605(b) right to appeal, despite the fact the
trial court informed the defendant at sentencing of the Rule 604(d) requirement of filing a
timely motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment).
697. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1078,438 N.E.2d 643 (1st Dist. 1982)
(failure to admonish defendant regarding right to appeal and that a written motion to
withdraw guilty plea is required to perfect the appeal prompted court to consider the
appeal, albeit imperfect, of defendant).
698. See, e.g., In the Interest of F.D., A Minor, 89 I11.App. 3d 223, 411 N.E.2d 1200
(2d Dist. 1980) (juvenile defendants' failure to perfect their right to appeal pursuant to

Rule 604(d), that is,to move to vacate their guilty pleas before an appeal can be taken
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lously honor Rule 605(b) and fully advise the defendant about appeal procedures following a guilty plea. 699
6. Timely Notice of Appeal
Rule 604(d) provides that a criminal defendant has thirty days
from the imposition of sentence to file a motion to withdraw the
7
guilty plea and vacate the judgment..
1 Upon denial of such a motion, Rule 604(d) provides a defendant with the right to appeal.701
In order to perfect the appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a
motion to vacate, the defendant must file notice of appeal within
thirty days 70 2 from the date of entry of the order denying the motion. 70 3 This section examines the degree to which Illinois courts
adhere to the time constraint regarding notice of appeal. Assuming the defendant is admonished properly about his appeal rights,
the appellate courts ordinarily refuse to entertain an appeal when
the defendant does not file timely notice of appeal.7 °4 It should be
noted, however, that in some instances, the court has exhibited a
surprisingly high tolerance for late notices of appeal. For instance,
in People v. Brown, °5 the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery and
was sentenced to a term of three to five years imprisonment.' °
The defendant subsequently filed a late notice of appeal, which was
dismissed because it was sixteen days overdue. The defendant
never filed a petition for leave to file a late notice of appeal. 70 7 The
defendant subsequently appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.0 8
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's dismissal of the appeal which had been based on defendant's failure to
file timely notice of appeal. 70 9 The court noted that the case had
been briefed and orally argued before the appellate court. Accordingly, the court held that dismissal at this point would unduly emexcused because the trial court failed to admonish the defendants of their right to appeal
under 605(b) and their need to file a motion to withdraw their admission and vacate the
pleas within thirty days under 604(d)).
699. ILL. S. Cr. R. 605(b), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 605(b).
700. ILL. S. CT. R. 604(d), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 604(d).
701. Id.
702. ILL. S. CT. R. 606, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 606.
703. ILL. S. Cr. R. 604(d), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 604(d).
704. See, e.g., People v. Delgado, 126 IlL. App. 3d 239, 466 N.E.2d 1277 (1st Dist.
1984); People v. Ervin, 103 Ill. App. 3d 465, 431 N.E.2d 453 (5th Dist. 1982).
705. People v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 25, 294 N.E.2d 267 (1973).
706. Id. at 25, 294 N.E.2d at 267.
707. Id. at 26, 294 N.E.2d at 268.
708. Id.

709. Id. at 26-27, 294 N.E.2d at 268.
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phasize formality at the expense of substance.71 °

In summary, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal may be
overlooked by the appellate courts, particularly where the appeal
has already been argued and has possible merit. This decision,
however, generally is left to the appellate court's discretion.7t ' The
only way to ensure appellate review is to follow the timely notice of
appeal requirements or to reveal aspects of the trial record which
demonstrate the trial judge's failure to properly admonish the accused regarding such right.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When a defendant pleads guilty to a charge, he waives his right
to challenge the charge at trial and to appeal the judgment of conviction. Because of the significant loss of constitutional and appeal
rights that he normally enjoys and to assure the defendant actually
understands the charge and potential sanction, the trial judge is
obligated by Boykin and its progeny, as well as various Illinois
Supreme Court Rules, to admonish the defendant about the
charge, possible sentences, waiver of trial rights and appeal rights,
and determine if he understands these concerns. In addition, the
trial judge must scrutinize the plea to determine whether it is voluntary and whether a factual basis actually supports the plea.
Although many Illinois opinions require relatively strict adherence to the principles of Boykin and the Supreme Court Rules,
other opinions, including several from the Illinois Supreme Court,
express a tolerance of a trial judge's failure to (1) fully admonish
the defendant about the charge, sentence possibilities, and constitutional rights waived and (2) ascertain whether the defendant actually understands the consequences of his plea. So too, some of
these decisions excuse the trial judge's failure to inquire into the
voluntariness of the plea. These cases appear to shift the focus of
the inquiry from whether the judge did admonish and inquire,
which assures the defendant actually made an intelligent and voluntary plea, to whether the defendant apparently understood the
dimensions of his plea and entered it freely, which is measured by
whether the defendant expressed some question about the process.
The fact that an accused has not raised some question about the
charge or sentence, his constitutional rights or the voluntariness of
his plea, however, cannot be equated with a clear understanding of
the process. This is particularly true when the trial judge himself
710. Id.
711. Id. at 27, 294 N.E.2d at 268.
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fails to mention a matter, ruch as the privilege against self-incrimination, about which the defendant may be wholly ignorant. Further, it must realized that certain individuals, with little or no
experience in the criminal justice system, may be sufficiently intimidated by the aura of the courtroom to express any question about
the procedures.
Not only can some of the Illinois opinions be criticized, but one
of the Supreme Court Rules raises serious questions. Rule 402 requires only "substantial compliance" with its requirement that
trial judges determine if the defendant (1) understands the charge,
sentence possibilities, right to a jury trial, right to confront his accusers, and privilege against self-incrimination and (2) is entering
his plea voluntarily. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court has
ruled that a trial judge must only substantially comply with Rule
401, whic' requires trial judges to assure that a defendant's waiver
of counsel is actually intelligent. Strict compliance is not required.
However, the admonishments regarding the defendant's appeal
rights, circumscribed by Rules 604 and 605, are not governed by
the "substantial compliance" standard. This differential treatment
of these matters seems curious. Is for instance, the defendant's
right to a jury trial less important than his right to appeal? Further, Boykin and its progeny does not support the "substantial
compliance" test of Rule 402.
It is submitted that the Illinois reviewing courts should question
the integrity of (1) some of the decisions, such as Stewart, which
were criticized in this Article, and (2) the "substantial compliance"
test. Further, trial judges should fully admonish defendants about

the consequences of their pleas and establish on the record that
they actually understand what is involved. Time-consuming as
such inquiries might be, they clearly bring finality and, more im-

portantly, fairness to the process. Accordingly, they are no less
than what may be expected of our judiciary.

